No abstract

No abstract

. Conflict management as a means to the sustainable use of natural resources. Silva Fennica 40(4): 687-728.Democratic societies' emphasis on individual rights and freedoms inevitably opens them up to political disputes. Conflict management should thus be seen as an integral part of democratic institutional design. The evolution and management of policy disputes concerning the use of different natural resources in Finland is analysed by using the theoretical models of frame analysis and strategic interaction. The studied disputes include lake fisheries, watercourse regulation, reindeer herding, and forestry. The institutional design in the case studies varies. Despite the differences, many common features are identified that could explain their successes or difficulties in achieving sustainable and cooperative use of the resources. Among these are problems involving complex and uncertain knowledge, differences in frames held by multiple users of a resource, and distrust between the users and other parties. The analysis concludes with preliminary conclusions on how various disputes related to sustainable resource use could be managed. These include addressing the knowledge and frame problems in order to initiate a learning process; establishing sub-processes in which mutual trust between the parties -including a managing authority or a third party -can emerge; giving explicit roles and a clear division of entitlement to the parties; and providing a credible alternative for co-operation that affects the parties' payoff assessments during the process. Finally, the conflict management process shouldn't be regarded as a distinct phase of dispute resolution, but as an essential aspect of ongoing co-management practices of resource use.

Activities protesting against major polluters who cause climate change may cause damage to private property in the process. This paper investigates the case for a more international general basis of moral justification for such protests. Specific reference is made to the Kingsnorth case, which involved a protest by Greenpeace against coal-powered electricity generation in the UK. An appeal is made to Rawlsian fairness arguments, traditionally employed to support the obligation of citizens to their national governments as opposed to their international duties. The argument made here, however, is that there seem to be sufficient reasons for holding that a stable climate is one of the first truly global public goods that is indispensable to acceptable standards of living everywhere. This would suffice to justify international and intergenerational 'atmospheric' political obligations, which in turn may justify protests - even those causing some damage to private property - against the laws and policies that violate the fair terms of cooperation in providing a stable climate. The fairness argument aims also to provide a ground from which Green political theory could integrate accounts of radical forms of citizenship into appeals to state political authority. This leads to justifying acts of civil disobedience on the basis of novel understandings of 'atmospheric' citizenship obligations.

The article defends the no‐harm principle as an intuitively plausible and a common‐sense way to justify individual emitters’ duties to take more radical steps in the fight against climate change. The appearance of climate change as requiring large‐scale collective action should not lead us astray with respect to the fundamental moral nature of the problem: individual emitters who knowingly sustain and foster the carbon intensive ways of acting also bear personal moral responsibility for the foreseeable climate‐related harm and acquire in line with the no‐harm principle a direct personal duty to contribute to the efforts of preventing the harm. The article examines more closely the so‐called collectivistic approach, according to which emitters’ responsibilities are primarily collective, and argues that without individualistic grounds of emitters’ personal moral responsibility for the harm the collectivistic approach fails to provide unstructured emitters with sufficient reason to act together and fulfil their correlative duty of effective harm prevention. The article argues that since an emitter's personal moral responsibility warrants others to expect her personal engagement in the efforts of effective harm prevention and can justify blame if she fails, identifications of personal responsibility may also significantly increase unstructured emitters’ collective capability of remedying the climate crisis.