No abstract

It is an ironic truism of our time that a bureaucratic apparatus often produces effects that conf lict with bureaucratic goals. Such "unintended outcomes" result from complex governmental procedures that can create momentum and lead to developments that deviate from the original intent. While acknowledging the endless red tape that bureaucracies seem to generate, I aim to show analytically that it is misleading to define contra-indicated results of official practice as "unanticipated consequences" (Merton 1936; Merton 1968) or "unintended outcomes" (Foucault 1991) in reference to official government goals. As De Genova appropriately stresses, this interpretation expresses "'good faith' toward the state, and its underlying belief in the law's transparency [and] does not allow for the possibility that the law may have been instrumental in generating parameters" (2002: 432). Or, as Frank De Zwart points out: "social scientists, eager to speak truth to power, should consider the possibility that those in power may know the truth, yet let bad things happen anyway because they fear worse" (2015: 295). Analysis of "unintended" or "unanticipated" effects from the "good faith" perspective neglects the involvement of numerous actors with varying interests in the negotiating process and in the implementation of new practices. Foucault respects these complex motivations when he observes that actors respond to outcomes by calculating, capitalizing and integrating them into their future conduct (Li 2007: 287). Thus, we should not see bureaucratic practices as pursuing one well-defined, publicly articulated goal. Rather, as Shore and Wright emphasize, the process of policy building is one of negotiation by various actors and interests (Shore and Wright 2011). Thus, the final configuration of a concrete bureaucratic practice always ref lects the power relations of the actors involved in the negotiation process.

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract