We found an increasing rate of paediatric admissions to our general ICU over the years. We also found a high mortality rate among paediatric patients admitted to our ICU. The poor outcome in paediatric patients managed in our ICU appears to be a reflection of the inadequacy of facilities. Better equipping our ICUs and improved man-power development would improve the outcome for our critically ill children. Hospitals in our region should also begin to look into the feasibility of establishing PICUs in order to further improve the standard of critical care for our children.

BackgroundJos has witnessed a series of civil crises which have generated mass casualties that the Jos University Teaching Hospital has had to respond to from time to time. We review the challenges that we encountered in the management of the victims of the 2001 crisis.MethodologyWe reviewed the findings of our debriefing sessions following the sectarian crisis of September 2001 and identified the challenges and obstacles experienced during these periods.ResultsCommunication was a major challenge, both within and outside the hospital. In the field, there was poor field triage and no prehospital care. Transportation and evacuation was hazardous, for both injured patients and medical personnel. This was worsened by the imposition of a curfew on the city and its environs. In the hospital, supplies such as fluids, emergency drugs, sterile dressings and instruments, splints, and other consumables, blood and food were soon exhausted. Record keeping was erratic. Staff began to show signs of physical and mental exhaustion as well as features of anxiety and stress. Tensions rose between different religious groups in the hospital and an attempt was made by rioters to attack the hospital. Patients suffered poor subsequent care following resuscitation and/or surgery and there was neglect of patients on admission prior to the crisis as well as non trauma medical emergencies.ConclusionMass casualties from disasters that disrupt organized societal mechanisms for days can pose significant challenges to the best of institutional disaster response plans. In the situation that we experienced, our disaster plan was impractical initially because it failed to factor in such a prolongation of both crisis and response. We recommend that institutional disaster response plans should incorporate provisions for the challenges we have enumerated and factor in peculiarities that would emanate from the need for a prolonged response.

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