This paper examines two hypotheses about the effects of UN sanctions on trade flows between land neighbours of the target country and the rest of the world. First, there have been claims that sanctions hurt neighbour countries by cutting off trading routes, increasing transportation costs and disrupting established trading ties. We would expect that a neighbour's trade with the rest of the world would fall, as a result. Second, there is extensive evidence that neighbours have been involved in smuggling. Consequently, neighbours should trade more with the rest of the world during UN trade embargoes, because now they also trade on behalf of the target. I employ the gravity model of international trade to show that, overall, a neighbour's trade with the rest of the world tends to fall during UN sanctions episodes. This confirms the first hypothesis above: on a net basis, land neighbours have been 'innocent bystanders' hit by UN sanctions. Copyright 2007 The Author Journal compilation 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd .

The short answer: The size of the Russian State has not increased much in the last few years, but its economic footprint remains significant. Concretely, the state's size increased from about 32 percent of GDP in 2012 to 33 percent in 2016, not far from the EBRD's estimate of 35 percent for 2005-10. This is different from the mainstream narrative, which contends that the state's size doubled in the last decade. However, a deep state footprint is reflected in a relatively high state share in formal sector activity (close to 40 percent) and formal sector employment (about 50 percent). The deep footprint is also reflected in market competition and efficiency. Although sectors in which the state is present are more concentrated, concentration is large even in sectors where the state's share is low. This suggests the need to protect and promote competition, in particular in state procurement. Finally, stateowned enterprises' performance appears weaker than that of privately-owned firms, which may be subtracting from growth.

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Anecdotal evidence suggests that the economies of South Africa and its neighbours (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe) are tightly integrated with each other. The multiple interconnections suggest that South Africa's GDP growth rate should affect positively its neighbours'. However, our review of the available econometric evidence and our panel growth regressions suggest that there is no strong evidence of real spillovers in the region after 1994, once global shocks are controlled for. More generally, we find no evidence of real spillovers from South Africa to the rest of the continent post‐1994. We investigate the possible reasons for this lack of spillovers. Most importantly, the economies of South Africa and the rest of Sub‐Saharan Africa might have decoupled in the mid‐1990s. That is when international sanctions on South Africa ended and the country re‐integrated with the global economy, while growth in the rest of the continent accelerated due to a combination of domestic and external factors.