The literature studying the behavioral effects of political corruption is rapidly growing. While some studies explore the contextual and institutional factors that can neutralize the effects of corruption, this article addresses a different mechanism for weak electoral accountability for corruption: citizen (de)mobilization. It uses a vignette experiment embedded in a nationally representative AmericasBarometer survey in Colombia to isolate the causal effect of political corruption on electoral participation. The results suggest that receiving credible information about the corrupt behavior of politicians running for office decreases the likelihood of participation in elections. It also shows that corruption demobilizes voters even when corrupt politicians are able to provide public works to their constituencies, which casts doubt on the idea that citizens exchange integrity for favorable policy outcomes.

No abstract

el 2007 en el perú se caracterizó por una suerte de "neodualismo". de un lado, tenemos una parte del país, más urbana, moderna y costeña, relativamente optimista respecto al futuro, que se beneficia del crecimiento de la economía y, del otro, tenemos un país más rural, serrano y amazónico, en el que los beneficios del crecimiento no se perciben, donde los niveles de pobreza se mantienen altos, en el que la legitimidad de las instituciones políticas se mantienen baja. el crecimiento económico ha aumentado la desigualdad y ha revelado los límites institucionales del estado para gestionar eficientemente los recursos disponibles. esto ha generado tensiones y frustraciones que se expresan en el aumento de los conflictos sociales, así como en la caída en la aprobación a la gestión presidencial. a pesar de esto, el gobierno ratificó su apuesta política por la promoción de la inversión privada, y mostró una relativa pasividad en materia de reformas institucionales y políticas sociales. el gobierno parece confiar en que el crecimiento económico irá paulatinamente reduciendo la conflictividad y el descontento social; los únicos que podrían atentar contra este esquema son los "los perros del hortelano", quienes traban la inversión privada.

Do men and women exhibit different attitudes and behaviors toward COVID-19 public health measures? Is there a gender gap in support for and compliance with government recommendations during a public health crisis? While the disproportionate effect of the pandemic on women suggests that they would oppose burdensome quarantine measures, theories of gender differences in prosocial and communion attitudes indicate that women should be more likely to conform with public health measures designed to protect the most vulnerable. We test hypotheses about a gender gap in attitudes toward public health recommendations through an original, nationally representative survey implemented in Peru, one of the countries hit hardest by the coronavirus pandemic, and the construction of a representative matched sample that allows us to make comparisons between women and men. We find that women are more likely than men to endorse lockdown measures and to support the continuation of a nationwide quarantine. We also find evidence of a gender gap in compliance with public health recommendations about avoiding crowded areas and social gatherings. Our findings have important policy implications. The results suggest that public health recommendations to fight COVID-19 should be framed in a way that maximizes compliance by both men and women.

The literature studying citizen responses to exposed political corruption is rapidly growing. While some studies explore how information credibility and group identities can reduce the electoral impact of the exposure of corruption, this article addresses different mechanisms for weak electoral accountability for corruption: candidate competence in public works provision and corruption prevalence. It uses a vignette experiment embedded in a national survey in Peru to isolate the causal effect of political corruption on electoral support. The results suggest that even types of corruption with side benefits would be harshly punished when attributed to incompetent politicians. They also indicate that while voters punish corruption more leniently when a candidate is competent, they respond negatively to corruption regardless of the prevalence of corruption, which casts doubt on the idea that voters in highly corrupt environments are acceptant of corruption.