PurposeResearch on gender and finance finds that women chief executive officers (CEOs) are relatively risk-averse and more ethical than their male counterparts. These differences are often presented as reasons for lower earnings management by firms led by women. A strand of contrasting literature however finds the notions of women being risk-averse and ethical not necessarily true for women occupying top leadership positions as women successful in shattering the glass ceiling adopt behaviors like men. This study attempts to understand the differences between the ethical tendencies of the two genders by examining if CEO power impacts the relation between CEO gender and earnings management.Design/methodology/approachThe authors begin the analysis using standard regressions using the propensity score matched (PSM) samples and examine if CEO power mediates or amplifies relationship between CEO gender and earnings management. The authors use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression approach and instrumental variables (IV) estimation to address the endogeneity concerns.FindingsThis study’s results suggest that the relationship between CEO gender and earnings management is mediated by CEO power. The authors find that women CEOs with lower power engage in lower earnings management. However, women CEOs with more power tend to engage in greater levels of earnings management than their male counterparts.Originality/valueThis study contributes the finance literature by showing women leaders successful in occupying top leadership positions are not necessarily more risk averse and more ethical. Less powerful women CEOs are subjected to potentially higher levels of scrutiny and are forced into an environment where they have to be seen as ethical. However, powerful women face the same concerns as their male counterparts and not necessarily more ethical.

PurposeThe purpose of the study is to examine the zero-leverage (ZL) phenomenon in family and non-family firms.Design/methodology/approachThe authors consider three hypotheses and empirically test them using a sample of the largest US firms over the 2001–2016 period.FindingsThe authors find that, on average, 19.20% of family firms have zero debt vs 10.42% for non-family firms. The authors also find that family firms strategically choose to be ZL to maintain financial flexibility for future investments and exercise control over the decision-making process, consistent with the hypotheses of financial flexibility and control considerations. However, non-family firms are more likely to have zero debt if they have financial constraints and the credit market does not lend them money at affordable credit rates, consistent with the financial constraint hypothesis.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to different strands of literature. First, the authors contribute to the literature examining family firms' financial decisions. Second, the authors complement previous studies by exploring the reasons for the ZL behavior of family firms compared to non-family firms. The authors also examine the previously unexplored impact of ownership concentration on the ZL question.