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In this paper, we propose an end-to-end grasp evaluation model to address the challenging problem of localizing robot grasp configurations directly from the point cloud. Compared to recent grasp evaluation metrics that are based on handcrafted depth features and a convolutional neural network (CNN), our proposed PointNetGPD is lightweight and can directly process the 3D point cloud that locates within the gripper for grasp evaluation. Taking the raw point cloud as input, our proposed grasp evaluation network can capture the complex geometric structure of the contact area between the gripper and the object even if the point cloud is very sparse. To further improve our proposed model, we generate a larger-scale grasp dataset with 350k real point cloud and grasps with the YCB object set for training. The performance of the proposed model is quantitatively measured both in simulation and on robotic hardware. Experiments on object grasping and clutter removal show that our proposed model generalizes well to novel objects and outperforms state-of-the-art methods. Code and video are available at https://lianghongzhuo.github.io/PointNetGPD.

In China’s transitional economy, one of the major objectives of the government is to maintain social stability. We hypothesize that, through state ownership and appointment of executives, Chinese government officials can influence firms’ labor employment decisions by limiting layoffs when firms’ sales decline. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have stickier labor costs than non-SOEs, and the presence of politically connected managers makes labor costs even stickier in SOEs while having little effect in non-SOEs. Such effects are stronger in regions with weak market institutions and during time periods when government officials are to be promoted. We also show that the government reciprocates SOEs’ sticky labor policies with subsequent subsidies. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.

In China's political selection system, officials capable of growing local economies are reward-ed with promotions. Eager to demonstrate economic achievements, newly appointed local lead-ers may raise tax revenues to expand fiscal expenditures on infrastructure projects. Against this backdrop, we study how political appointments influence local firms' tax planning. Based on a sample of locally administered state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we find firms decrease their tax avoidance after new leaders take office. The political-turnover effect on these firms' tax positions is more evident when the incoming leaders have more political clout over SOE managers, the incentives to divert resources are stronger, or politician-manager networks are present, and subsides following the launch of the anticorruption campaign. Furthermore, firms with higher post-turnover tax payments subsequently receive more government contracts or subsidies. Overall, our findings suggest political incentives shape the tax-planning activities of SOE managers in a "two-way favor exchange" manner.

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