This paper examines different barriers to formal saving, considering various interventions and their possible effects at microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. It presents a comprehensive review of the literature, based on a detailed classification of the barriers associated with supplyside factors, related to access to financial products, and demand-side barriers, related to the use and frequency of use of those products. The paper concludes that this classification and analysis contributes to a fuller understanding of the question of financial inclusion, and how to achieve it.

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We study the problem of an investor who buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter's operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of repeated moral hazard. In particular, our framework generates a rationale for firm decline. As young firms accumulate capital, the claims of both investor (outside equity) and entrepreneur (inside equity) increase. At some juncture, however, even as the latter keeps on growing, invested capital and firm value start declining and so does the value of outside equity. The reason is that incentive provision is costlier the wealthier the entrepreneur (the greater is inside equity). In turn, this leads to a decline in the constrained-efficient level of effort and therefore to a drop in the return to investment.

Several initiatives have been undertaken over the last few decades to promote the adoption of insurance products among vulnerable populations in developing countries. Since the 1990s, the use of microinsurance-insurance product characterized by low premiums and low caps coverage-has shown demonstrable benefits for people with low income (Cheston, 2018). Today, these products are part of wider trends, such as inclusive insurance or mass insurance, that expand the insurance market to all those who have not been served by traditional insurance. These products are characterized by