This article explores the effects of proscription -the act of listing an armed group as a designated terrorist organisation -as an example of how international counterterrorist policy can impact on the possibility for third-party actors to engage with listed armed groups in the context of peace processes. From a peace practitioner's perspective, the article draws on findings from a series of workshops organised with high-level mediators, counterterrorism policy-makers and diplomats, and interviews with policy actors and non-governmental peace-building organisations. The article concludes that the listing of armed groups as terrorist organisations is having serious consequences on the ability of third-party actors to engage with armed groups. It has affected both of the preconditions of access and trust, thereby narrowing the possibilities for third parties to effectively understand groups, influence them, affect their strategic calculations and train them in conflict resolution. The global proscription regime appears to be eroding in practice, with state third-party actors choosing to opt out of international proscription regimes. Doubts about the legality of third-party engagement are creating a new selective pressure on what types of conflict resolution activities are possible.

Villains need to be de-villainized for talking to begin; this is a cornerstone of negotiation literature. But what happens when villains are proscribed, or listed as terrorists? While an emerging body of work has started to explore the effects of proscription by emphasizing aspects of demonization and banishment, it has not so far explored how banishment ends. This article offers a theoretical and empirical contribution to this discussion by exploring the effects of proscription on the dynamic interaction between conflict parties and how negotiations still do take place with armed groups listed as terrorists. To do this it maps representations made by the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia through a qualitative discourse analysis of 335 statements triangulated with 50 personal interviews. The article argues that proscription makes the initiation of negotiations impossible because it leads to a form of extreme vilification. This is especially true for the government, unable to switch directly to de-vilifying its proscribed enemy. First it has to normalize its vilification – a concept I describe here as a ‘linguistic ceasefire’. This helps explain how banishment can end and peace negotiations can be initiated in an age of proscription.

Not long ago, it was accepted practice to 'talk to whomever you need to talk to for peace'. Then the idea that you cannot talk to 'terrorists' took hold. The article explores norm contestation, what happens when hard norms interact with softer norm even when they are settled and central to mediation practice. The article traces the emergence, development and interaction of these two contradictory norms in key United Nations documents and discussions since 1945. It also triangulates this content analysis with personal interviews with UN mediators and perspectives from international non-governmental mediators. The article argues that over the last 20 years the embedding of proscription regimes in the multilateral system has deeply reshaped fundamental norms underlying mediation such as impartiality, inclusivity and the idea that mediators should be able to speak to everyone to protect human lives.

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