Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Recently, a voluminous literature estimating the taxable income elasticity has emerged as an important field in empirical public economics. However, to a large extent it is still unknown how the hourly wage rate, an important component of taxable income, reacts to changes in marginal tax rates. In this study we use a rich panel data set and a sequence of tax reforms that took place in Sweden during the 1980's to estimate the elasticity of the hourly wage rate with respect to the net-of-tax rate. While carefully accounting for the endogeneity of marginal tax rates as well as other factors that determine wage rates we do find a statistically significant response both among married men and married women. The hourly wage rate elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate is estimated to 0.14-0.16 for males and 0.41-0.57 for females. In addition, we obtain uncompensated taxable labor income elasticities of around 0.21 for men and 0.96-1.44 for women. In contrast to earlier studies, we also find significant income effects for males. Accordingly, for males the compensated taxable labor income elasticity is about 4 percentage points higher than the uncompensated one. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Code: H24, J22, J31.

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Choice models with nonlinear budget sets are important in econometrics. In this paper we propose a nonparametric approach to estimation of choice models with nonlinear budget sets. The basic idea is to think of the choice, in our case hours of labor supply, as being a function of the entire budget set. Then

Choice models with nonlinear budget sets are important in econometrics. In this paper we propose a nonparametric approach to estimation of choice models with nonlinear budget sets. The basic idea is to think of the choice, in our case hours of labor supply, as being a function of the entire budget set. Then

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. University of Wisconsin Press andThe Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Human Resources. ABSTRACT This paper estimates labor supply functions for married men and women in Sweden using data from 1980, taking account of the complete form of individuals' budget constraints. Both linear and quadratic supply functions are estimated, with and without random preferences. A novel feature is that for women the wage rate and labor supply functions are estimated simultaneously using a full information maximum likelihood method. This method yields substantially larger wage and income elasticities than does the previously used two step methods. Another result is that the quadratic supply function wage elasticities for men and women are virtually the same if the elasticities are evaluated at the same net wage rate and hours of work for men and women. The estimated functions are used to calculate the effect of tax reforms.Soren Blomquist is a professor of economics and Urban Hansson-Brusewitz is a graduate student at the University of Stockholm. The final version of the paper was written while Blomquist was a visiting professor at Princeton University. The authors are grateful for helpful comments from conference participants and two anonymous referees.