The legitimacy of the Group of 20 (G20) is frequently challenged: the group has been criticised by non-member states, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and in both the scientific and broader public debate with regard to the content and effectiveness of its policy measures and its limited membership structure. Accountability mechanisms can attenuate these shortcomings in different ways: they can increase the capacity of the citizens of the member states to surveil the activities of the G20 and can form the basis of learning processes within the group so as to increase effectiveness. In addition, accountability mechanisms directed towards non-member states can make the G20 more receptive to the interests of people who do not live in its own countries but are nevertheless affected by the policies of the G20. In this paper we analyse the existing accountability mechanisms of the G20 and discuss the challenges that the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as a guiding framework for G20 work poses to them. While the G20 also constitutes a platform for the reciprocal accountability of its individual member countries, our focus lies on the accountability mechanisms of the institution of the G20 as a whole. Based on the literature, we can identify three elements of accountability: transparency, justification, and enforcement. The institutionalised accountability mechanisms of the G20 are primarily directed at the first two elements of accountability, as the G20-like all club governance institutions is not subject to any formal sanctioning mechanisms. However, besides being valuable in their own right, transparency and justification make weaker forms of sanctions such as criticism by independent agents as well as reputational effects possible. The most prominent accountability mechanisms of the G20 are its interaction with the media; the publication of accountability reports; and a dialogue process with the so-called Engagement Groups from civil society, business, and academia. In the end, these mechanisms are intended to render the G20 accountable to the citizens within and outside G20 countries (either directly, or mediated by other agents). At the same time, however, they sometimes also fulfil an additional function for the G20 itself, namely tracking its own work towards its commitment to learn from past experiences. In 2015, the international community adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as a universal development agenda. The G20 assumed the principles of the 2030 Agenda and a special responsibility for its implementation through its 2016 G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Thereby, new challenges for accountability in the G20 have arisen. When looking towards the future, several suggestions for the G20 can be raised in order to increase its accountability, particularly in light of the demands set by its role in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

In the last few decades, the democratic credentials of global governance institutions have been extensively debated in the fields of international relations and political philosophy. However, despite their prominent role in the architecture of global governance, club governance institutions like the Group of Seven (G7) or the Group of Twenty (G20) have rarely been considered from the perspective of democratic theory. Focussing on the G20, this paper analyses its functions in international political practice and discusses whether, in exercising these functions, the G20 exhibits a democratic deficit. As a standard of democracy, the analysis uses the all-affected principle, according to which all those who are affected by a policy decision should be given the opportunity to participate in decision-making. This paper identifies several democratic shortcomings of the G20, for instance related to the exclusion of citizens of non-member states and a lack of parliamentary and public control. By describing realisable reforms that could to some degree alleviate these shortcomings, it is shown that more democratic institutional alternatives are feasible. Thus, the ascription of a democratic deficit to the G20 is warranted.

Schlagwörter: Sharon Street, Konstruktivismus, Normativität, Externalismus, Internalismus Abstract: Sharon Street defends a Humean constructivism as a metaethical theory. In her opinion, the normative reasons of an agent depend on the system of her own normative judgements. A normative judgement is true if and only if it belongs to the ideally coherent set of normative judgements the agent would have in a refl ective 62 Sharon Streets Humeanischer Konstruktivismus equilibrium. This paper will discuss the question how this conception of normativity can be combined with a conception of morality. One option is to maintain a close connection between normativity and morality. In this case, the truth of moral propositions would have to be understood agent-relativ similar to Streets understanding of the truth of normative propositions. A second option is to stick to an absolutist understanding of moral propositions. However, in this case it would be conceivable that an agent does not have a reason to act morally. Both theoretical options seem to have counterintuitive implications which are related, for instance, to the possibility of moral blame or the conception of categorical moral demands. Building on ideas of Street, Bernard Williams and David Lewis, it will be argued that the described options (in particular the second one) do not depart that much from a conventional conception of morality than it might appear at first.

No abstract

Die demokratische Regression" bringt zentrale Themen der langjährigen wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit der beiden Autoren -Armin Schäfers Forschung zur abnehmenden Responsivität der Parlamente und Michael Zürns Forschung zu den Demokratiedefiziten politischer Institutionen jenseits der Nationalstaaten -zusammen und argumentiert dafür, dass beides zusammen den in den letzten Jahren zu beobachtenden Aufstieg autoritär-populistischer Parteien und Politiker*innen erklären kann. Damit wollen Schäfer und Zürn die verbreiteten sozioökonomischen und soziokulturellen Erklärungen für das Erstarken populistischer Parteien um eine genuin politische Erklärung ergänzen, die auf Schwächen in der Funktionsweise der Demokratien verweist.Schäfer und Zürn zeigen zunächst unter Bezugnahme auf verschiedene Indikatoren der empirischen Demokratiemessung, dass man tatsächlich von einer demokratischen Regression sprechen kann. Sowohl die Qualität der Demokratie in vielen Ländern als auch die Anzahl der Länder, die überhaupt als Demokratien bezeichnet werden sollten, nahm in den letzten Jahren ab. Diese Entwicklung steht nach Auffassung der Autoren mit dem Entstehen einer neuen politischen Konfliktlinie in Verbindung, die seit den 1980er-Jahren zunehmend neben die traditionelle Links-Rechts-Achse des Gegensatzes zwischen Arbeit und Kapital trat. Nach Schäfer und Zürn verläuft diese neue Konfliktlinie zwischen einem von den "liberalen Globalisten" (S. 80) vertretenen Kosmopolitismus und einer kommunitaristischen Gegenposition, die zurzeit in der öffentlichen politischen Auseinandersetzung hauptsächlich von autoritär-populistischen Parteien eingenommen wird.Für das Erstarken populistischer Parteien machen Schäfer und Zürn Defizite der bestehenden politischen Systeme der Demokratien verantwortlich. Erstens nahm