This article stems from the impression of being condemned to late and moralizing reactions in regard to advances in the life sciences. We suggest a return to a speculative and theoretical approach in posing the question(s) of the limit of possible thinking of the enhanced human. This return allows for the possibility to show, not just inductively, but "clearly and distinctly," the specific justifications and lines of reasoning of anthropocentric prejudice or species narcissism. It also enables us to move freely and precisely along the limits of thinking the human/non-human. In this way, we hope to put forward a few markers or guideposts that would further the debate about notions of human enhancement.

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The paper endeavours to offer a closer definition of the concepts of common good, public interest and the commons, analysing their usage in a contemporary and historical perspective. The common good has been one of the key subjects of moral and political philosophy since ancient times. Today, the term public interest is often used as a synonym for the term common good. However, we will try to show that they carry a somewhat different meaning. A recent significant echo of the long-standing debate on the common good can be recognized in the discussions surrounding the concept of commons, which refers to cultural, material and intellectual resources to which all members of a community claim the right to use. All three notions contribute to a deeper understanding of community well-being and the way to realize that well-being. However, authors that are studied in the paper emphasize differently the importance of the collectivity and the individual in that process. The concept of the common good, especially for pre-modern thinkers, refers to the good of the community from which follows the good of its members, while the appealing to the interests of individuals is considered immoral. Later, with the development of the concept of public interest, the individual is placed in the centre of consideration, and the well-being of the community is brought into relation with what is in the interest of its members. Ultimately, the notion of the commons brings the collectivity back to focus, and ?togetherness? becomes a key term in addressing the issues of degradation and sustainability of a wide range of goods.

This paper addresses the nexus between contingency, social engagement and change, through investigating the potential of severe ("disruptive") contingency to bring about new forms of joint agency. By challenging Boltanski's notion of existential tests (which can only be experienced in isolation), the paper argues that social actors can experience disruptive contingent events in an inherently intersubjective manner. Although they severely hinder social interaction, disruptive contingent events enable a possibility of what might be called "negative common knowledge" between social actors which in turn renders certain societal norms meaningless. This possibility is mediated through processes of mutual engagement (calls between actors) that could, further, be transformed into a new "norm circle" (Dave Elder-Vass). Social domination -in particular its "complex" variety -in this context appears as the obstructing of such transformation. A recent political episode in Serbia is analyzed to demonstrate the emancipatory potential of contingency and the logic of complex domination.

There are three approaches one can take toward the epistemic value of common sense. The pessimists will argue that common sense, due to its intrinsic tendency to reproduce prejudice and ideology, should somehow be displaced. Conversely, the optimist will maintain that common sense is a valuable type of knowledge because it prevents us from overlooking evident practical problems. This article aims to show that (a) neither of these two widespread accounts can explain why public invocation of common sense is, in fact, a reliable indicator that the reproduction of norms and rules of a given society is in crisis, and is therefore essentially a call for social engagement. And, more importantly, that (b) only the third, pragmatist approach to common sense can provide insight into its structure. This more diversified and interdisciplinary view can, in turn, shed new light on the relation between everyday knowledge and social theory.