I examine some of the key scientific precommitments of modern psychology, and argue that their adoption has the unintended consequence of rendering a purely psychological analysis of mind indistinguishable from a purely biological treatment. And, because these precommitments sanction an "authority of the biological," explanation of phenomena traditionally considered the purview of psychological analysis is fully subsumed under the biological. I next evaluate the epistemic warrant of these precommitments and suggest that there are good reasons to question their applicability to psychological science. I conclude that experiential aspects of reality (reflected in mental construct terms such as memory, belief, thought, and desire) give us reason to remain open to the need for psychological explanation in the treatment of mind.

In this article I argue for the importance of treating mental experience on its own terms. In defense of "experiential realism," I offer a critique of modern psychology's all-toofrequent attempts to effect an objectification and quantification of personal subjectivity. The question is "What can we learn about experiential reality from indices that, in the service of scientific objectification, transform the qualitative properties of experience into quantitative proxies?" I conclude that such treatment is neither necessary for realizing, nor sufficient for capturing, subjectively given states (such as perception, pain, imagery, fear, thought, memory)-that is, for understanding many of the principle objects of psychological inquiry. A "science of mind" that approaches its subject matter from a third-person perspective should, I contend, be treated with a healthy amount of informed skepticism.

I argue that the feeling that one is the owner of his or her mental states is not an intrinsic property of those states. Rather, it consists in a contingent relation between consciousness and its intentional objects. As such, there are (a variety of) circumstances, varying in their interpretive clarity, in which this relation can come undone. When this happens, the content of consciousness still is apprehended, but the feeling that the content "belongs to me" no longer is secured. I discuss the implications of a mechanism enabling personal ownership for understanding a variety of clinical syndromes as well normal mental function.

This article is about the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness (i.e., how is subjective experience possible given the scientific presumption that everything from molecules to minerals to minds is wholly physical?). I first argue that one of the most valuable tools in the scientific arsenal (metaphor) cannot be recruited to address the hard problem due to the inability to forge connections between the stubborn fact of subjective experience and physically grounded models of scientific explanation. I then argue that adherence to the physicalist tenets of contemporary science has a limiting effect on a full appreciation of the phenomenon under discussion.

In this paper, I first consider a famous objection that the standard interpretation of the Lockean account of diachronicity (i.e., one's sense of personal identity over time) via psychological connectedness falls prey to breaks in one's personal narrative. I argue that recent case studies show that while this critique may hold with regard to some long-term autobiographical self-knowledge (e.g., episodic memory), it carries less warrant with respect to accounts based on trait-relevant, semantic selfknowledge. The second issue I address concerns the question of diachronicity from the vantage point that there are (at least) two aspects of self-the self of psychophysical instantiation (what I term the epistemological self) and the self of first person subjectivity (what I term the ontological self; for discussion, see Klein SB, The self and its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474-518, 2012). Each is held to be a necessary component of selfhood, and, in interaction, they are appear jointly sufficient for a synchronic sense of self (Klein SB, The self and its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474-518, 2012). As pertains to diachronicity, by contrast, I contend that while the epistemological self, by itself, is precariously situated to do the work required by a coherent theory of personal identity across time, the ontological self may be better positioned to take up the challenge.