Why would dictators purge members of their ruling coalition? Some argue that doing so can minimize the risk to dictators’ political survival, while others contend that dictators who mount purges are motivated by the desire to share resources with fewer allies. In this study, we analyze an original dataset, compiled from biographical data on the subordinates of the founding emperors of seven ancient Chinese imperial dynasties. Analyzing the data with competing risks models, we find that military experience is a strong predictor of political purges. Emperors were less likely to execute officers who had fought in more battles, but more likely to execute commanders, especially those who had established military credentials prior to the founding of an empire. In addition, the incidence of political purges heightened toward the end of an emperor’s life, which implies that the founding emperors were concerned about the security threats against their designated successors. Potential challengers came not only from the military, but also from the aristocracy. Indeed, we find that the blood relatives of the emperors were more likely to experience a mild form of purges: deprivation of titles. These findings suggest that dictators are more likely to use purges to reduce existential threats.

ObjectiveIn this article, we explore the seldom studied concept of “distant participation,” defined as the experience of social movements (such as receiving information from online media) from overseas. Online media may affect people's political attitudes, but how people use online media is also contingent upon their political attitudes.MethodWe take advantage of a natural experiment to deal with this endogenous selection problem. Our treatment group consists of college students who happened to join a short‐term overseas exchange program during the Umbrella Movement, which had an unexpectedly large turnout in Hong Kong. These students had a different mode of participation in the event from their peers physically in Hong Kong. The experience, including intensive exposure to online media, changed their media consumption habits, and hence their political attitudes.ResultsWe find that the treatment group is more likely to report using online media to obtain news. They also have a stronger sense of political efficacy and significantly weaker national identity. We, however, find no significant difference between the treatment and control groups regarding civic and political participation.ConclusionThis study provides a rare contribution to the study of the effect of online media by tackling the problem of selection. The concept of distant participation should also be given more attention given the ease of population flow and technological advancement nowadays.

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Some attribute China's rapid economic growth to a cadre promotion system that rewards economic performance. Others argue that political promotion in China hinges on factionalism. Extant empirical studies often assume that performance can be measured independently from the effect of factionalism. We test the validity of this assumption by examining whether local cadres’ economic performance would change as a result of losing vertical ties to a higher authority. We find an immediate increase in the growth rates of local GDP and government revenue. However, the performance change is mediated by the type of succeeding leaders, as it occurs only under locally promoted leaders who have existing ties with the local cadres. We further examine various channels through which a leader's insider status may affect local economic performance and find that newly appointed outsider leaders would cut fiscal transfers to the local level, which may explain the drop in their short‐term performance.

Whether local officials in China are promoted on a meritocratic basis has been the subject of long-standing debate. Merit is commonly gauged by a leader's ability to deliver local GDP growth. Although some find economic performance to be a strong predictor of the career success of local leaders, we argue that the existing measure, which focuses on the promotion outcome of a single career step, is problematic because the career success of individual local leaders is seldom determined by a single promotion, or the lack thereof. We propose an alternative measure that is more suitable for China's political context: the length of time until promotion. Analysing the time it takes to gain promotion for four types of local leaders, we find that good economic performance is associated with a shorter time until promotion. However, the cumulative time-reducing effect of economic performance is far from significant, as it is generally insufficient to help local leaders overcome the age ceiling for promotion.