Are there any such things as mind parasites? By analogy with biological parasites, such cultural items are supposed to subvert or harm the interests of their host. The hypothesis of cultural parasitism has appeared in different guises in the burgeoning field of cultural evolution. To unpack the notion of mind parasites, we first clear some conceptual ground around the concept of cultural adaptation and its relation to human agency. We then formulate Millikan's challenge: how can cultural items develop novel purposes of their own, crosscutting or subverting our own personal purposes? If this central challenge is not met, talk of cultural 'parasites' or 'selfish memes' remains vacuous. First, we discuss why other attempts to answer Millikan's challenge have failed. In particular, we put to rest the claims of panmemetics, a somewhat sinister worldview according to which human culture is nothing more than a swarm of selfish agents, plotting and scheming behind the scenes. Next, we reject a more reasonable, but still overly permissive approach to mind parasites, which equates them with biologically maladaptive culture. Finally, we present our own answer to Millikan's challenge: certain systems of misbelief can be fruitfully treated as cultural parasites, designed by cultural evolution to subvert the interests of their human hosts. As a proof of concept, we discuss witchcraft beliefs in early modern Europe, and show how the meme's eye view promises to shed new light on a mystery that historians and social scientists have been wrestling with for decades.

Functionalistische sociologen stelden ooit dat de functies van sociaal-culturele verschijnselen door de betrokken actoren in veel gevallen niet worden bedoeld en herkend; Robert Merton omschreef het als ‘latente functies’. Hedendaagse sociologen ontkennen doorgaans echter het bestaan van dergelijke latente functies. Als sociaal-culturele functies immers niet door de handelende actoren zelf worden geconstrueerd, blijft onduidelijk wie of wat daar wel voor verantwoordelijk is. Critici erkenden dat de functies van sociaal-culturele verschijnselen niet altijd overeenstemmen met de redenen die mensen er zelf voor geven, maar wezen daarbij op het belang van ‘tacit knowledge’. In dit artikel wordt echter betoogd dat Robert Merton waarschijnlijk toch gelijk had. Via een darwiniaans mechanisme van selectie en accumulatie van culturele toevalstreffers, is de evolutie van latente functies hoogst plausibel.

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The theory of Darwinian cultural evolution is gaining currency in many parts of the socio-cultural sciences, but it remains contentious. Critics claim that the theory is either fundamentally mistaken or boils down to a fancy re-description of things we knew all along. We will argue that cultural Darwinism can indeed resolve long-standing socio-cultural puzzles; this is demonstrated through a cultural Darwinian analysis of the European witch persecutions. Two central and unresolved questions concerning witch-hunts will be addressed. From the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, a remarkable and highly specific concept of witchcraft was taking shape in Europe. The first question is: who constructed it? With hindsight, we can see that the concept contains many elements that appear to be intelligently designed to ensure the continuation of witch persecutions, such as the witches' sabbat, the diabolical pact, nightly flight, and torture as a means of interrogation. The second question is: why did beliefs in witchcraft and witchhunts persist and disseminate, despite the fact that, as many historians have concluded, no one appears to have substantially benefited from them? Historians have convincingly argued that witch-hunts were not inspired by some hidden agenda; persecutors genuinely believed in the threat of witchcraft to their communities. We propose that the apparent 'design' exhibited by concepts of witchcraft resulted from a Darwinian process of evolution, in which cultural variants that accidentally enhanced the reproduction of the witch-hunts were selected and accumulated. We argue that witch persecutions form a prime example of a 'viral' socio-cultural phenomenon that reproduces 'selfishly', even harming the interests of its human hosts.