This article presents the CJEU Database Platform, which provides scholars with an extensive collection of easily accessible, research-ready data on the the universe of cases, decisions, and judges at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The CJEU Database Platform provides a foundation for the broader CJEU Database currently being developed by The IUROPA Project, a multidisciplinary group of scholars researching judicial politics in the European Union (EU). In this article, we illustrate how the CJEU Database Platform opens the door to new areas of theoretical and empirical research on judicial politics in the EU.

The benefits of timely justice and rigorous judicial argument are impossible to overstate and hard to reconcile. In its struggle to deliver both, the Court of Justice of the European Union has initiated several reforms of its procedures. The so-called adjudicating orders arguably achieve the impossible: They fast-track recurring questions while safeguarding legal coherence. The present article unpacks this premise. It shows that seemingly inconsequential procedural amendments, often overlooked by scholars, give the Court full control over relevant European legal problems, and centralize its power. Concretely, the analysis introduces a typology of orders of the Court, to demonstrate the unique legal character of adjudicating orders. It then investigates their effects against the backdrop of manifold procedural reforms and institutional adjustments. The findings indicate that the greatest efficiency gains follow reforms, which the Court initiates and implements in relative anonymity. Moreover, the use of adjudicating orders increases in response to a sudden and considerable increase of legally similar preliminary references from one Member State. An equal increase of references from the courts of several Member States has no such effect. The findings suggest that the Court uses adjudicating orders to disengage from 'local' problems and unilaterally terminate the conversations with resolute national courts. Thereby, the preliminary reference procedure, envisaged and promoted as a collaborative tool, transforms into a centralized mechanism of speedy and authoritative dispute resolution.

Effective procedural arrangements allow courts to reconcile conflicting demands of timely justice and sound legal argument. In the context of the European Union, conflict between these demands emerged most acutely in the face of paralyzing delays in the preliminary reference procedure. It was partly solved by Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure. The provision allowed the European Court of Justice to dispose of repetitive and legally undemanding cases with a reasoned order in lieu of a judgment. This article analyses all published orders of the European Court of Justice to examine the use and the implications of Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure. It is the first article to do so. We find that the Court resorts to orders to save time and to halt repeated questions from the courts of a single Member State.

Orders are judicial decisions designed to shore up fair and timely resolution of disputes. As written, detailed, and factual documents, they are reliable markers of procedural steps and a unique source of information about the inner working of an institution. This article examines all published orders of the European Court of Justice, drawing lessons from their use. The analysis demonstrates that the pursuit of efficiency and uniform application blurs the lines between the administration and judging. First, it centralises the institution, expanding the duties of the Registry and amplifying the role of the Cabinet of the President of the Court. Second, it bureaucratises the interpretation and the uniform application of European Union law. These processes are common in judicial institutions with no power over their dockets. But the particular European response, authored by the Court, also suggests its reluctance to forfeit the interpretive monopoly.