Stout, to argue that Canadian corporate law's understanding of public corporations that are not controlled by a single shareholder or group of shareholders reflects a director primacy norm rather than a shareholder primacy norm. Canadian corporate law provides that directors ofsuch public corporations with widely-held share ownership and voting rights arefreefrom direct control by any corporate stakeholders. A potential departing point for Canadian corporate law. the oppression remedy, continues to develop to deal with extra-legal advantages rooted primarily in unequal power relations among corporate stakeholders. However, in its current and predicted future applications, the oppression remedy does not provide any given stakeholder group with an ability to dominate the boards of public corporations and obviate the director primacy norm. The article suggests that because the director primacy norm accurately describes Canadian corporate law. further consideration needs to be given to corporate law'.« relative relevance in dictating how Canadian corporations currently operate. Cet article a trail a la iheorie de la production d'equipe developpe'e par des e'rudits du droit americain des societes. notamment Margaret Blair et Lynn Stout, a savoir que les socie'te's ouvertes i/ui ne sonl pas conlrale'es par tin seul actionnaire on tin grotipe d'actionnaires rejletentpliitoi la nonne de la primaule des administrateurs que celle de la primaule des acliottnaires. Le droit canadien des socie'te's stipule que les administrateurs des socie'te's ouvertes avec un grandnombre d'actionnaires el de droits de vote soul fibres du controle direct des intervenanm des sociele's. Eventuel point de depart pour le droit canadien des societes, le remede a I oppression continue a se developper en vue de trailer avec les avantages exlrajudiciaires ancres principalemenl dans les relations depouvoir inegales enlre les inlervenants des societes. Cependanl. dans ses applications actuelles el prevues. le remede de I 'oppression nefournil a aucun groupe d'intervenants donne la capacite de dominer les conseils d 'administration des sociele's ouverles et d'eviter ainsi la norme de la primaule des adminislrateun.

In this article, Professors Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Stephen Lubben explore the recent surge in popularity of “quick sales”, essentially the prereorganization sale of an insolvent debtor’s assets. In their examination of quick sales, the authors use the recent examples of the General Motors, Chrysler, and Lehman Brothers insolvencies to illustrate the popularity and relevance of preplan sales. The authors then move on to a more detailed discussion of the quick-sales process in the United States and Canada, explaining the differences and similarities between both countries’ regimes, and weighing the costs and benefits of each approach. Ultimately, the authors argue that elements of speed and certainty mark the biggest difference between the two jurisdictions, as the American approach offers greater flexibility, which is apt to facilitate quicker asset sales. However, Ben-Ishai and Lubben assert that the Canadian approach also provides significant benefits, particularly in the realm of employee protection and the ability of the monitor to act as an independent check on quick-sales proceedings. Accordingly, the authors conclude that while the American approach is advantageous in situations with exceptional time constraints, the Canadian approach under the Companies Creditors’ Arrangement Act (CCAA) is more beneficial for a typical corporate reorganization, insofar as the role of the monitor and other limitations of the CCAA prevent overuse of the quick-sales process.

Taken together the international move from liquidation to reorganization‐based bankruptcy regimes and the international move to abolish Crown priority in bankruptcy provide Canada with an opportunity to rethink Crown priority in bankruptcy. This paper makes the case that abolishing Crown priority in bankruptcy in Canada is optimal given a revaluation of traditional normative claims surrounding Crown priority in the context of a bankruptcy system that favours reorganization when possible. While this paper focuses on Canada, it engages in a normative assessment that may be useful for possible reforms to Crown priority in the United States and in other jurisdictions that, like Canada, have been influenced, not only by the English model, but also by the American bankruptcy and reorganization system. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

No abstract

With the increased sophistication of financial markets and financial instruments, the use of hybrid investments has been on the rise in recent decades. This article considers the question of how Canadian courts have drawn the border between debt and equity in the context of bankruptcy proceedings. The basic argument is that Canadian courts should allow the recent reforms to bring about their intended clarity on the border between debt and equity by not departing from the bright line test set out in the legislation. The article compares the pre and post--amendment case law and uses two case studies to illustrate the undue complexity that has been created by layering a contextual analysis on top of the new bright line tests. Simply put, in the context of investment classification decisions for the purposes of bankruptcy proceedings, Canadian courts should limit the scope of their analysis to an inquiry of whether the investment in question falls within the scope of the "equity claim" definition provided under Canadian bankruptcy legislation. Only then can bankruptcy costs be limited and can we come closer to a model assumed by the Modiglani--Miller Theorem.