We apply formal models of deterrence developed by Zagare and Kilgour (2000) to examine the impact of dispute settlements on future discord. Our theory of recurrent conflict, based primarily on how levels of satisfaction lead to different types of deterrence, allows us to formulate explicit expectations for the relative stability of militarized conflict settlements. We conceptualize peace periods following dispute settlements as situations of mutual or unilateral deterrence, depending on the method of resolution applied to the preceding dispute. Relations following imposed settlements are modeled as unilateral deterrence situations, while affairs subsequent to negotiated settlements and disputes ending without a settlement are viewed as instances of mutual deterrence. We derive hypotheses regarding durations of peace and test them through survival analyses of the periods of peace following 2,536 dyadic militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 1992. Our results strongly support the theory's expectations, with disputes characterized by an imposed settlement being followed by significantly longer durations of peace than disputes followed by either a negotiated settlement or no settlement at all. Leaders, policy makers, and diplomats expend great energy trying to ensure that the conclusion of one conflict will not soon be followed by the eruption of another. Yet the empirical record clearly shows the ubiquitous tendency of former foes to meet in repeat engagements. These recurring conflicts are particularly worthy of consideration as they tend to be more severe and costly than previous disputes. Interestingly, despite the high frequency and intensity of recurrent disputes and wars, conflict events are typically treated as independent. Some do argue, however, that conflict events are linked and focus largely on the effect of

Although deterrence theory was a central focus in the study of International Relations during the Cold War, attention has shifted away from deterrence since the end of that conflict. Nonetheless, deterrence is a general phenomenon that is not limited to any particular time or space. Moving beyond a simple focus on the US-Soviet relationship, scholars have recently begun further explorations of deterrence, through development of theory, analysis of policy alternatives, and empirical analysis. This article seeks to evaluate where deterrence theory stands today through: (1) a consideration of distinctions between different strands of theory; (2) a discussion of the assumption of rationality in deterrence theory; (3) an examination of three important distinctions in deterrence; (4) an evaluation of the difficult task of testing deterrence theory, and (5) an overview of recent theoretical developments. The primary conclusion is that perfect deterrence theory provides a logically consistent alternative to classical deterrence theory and therefore provides the most appropriate basis for further theoretical development, empirical testing, and application to policy.

Despite the hope that the resolution of one militarized dispute will bring peace to a dyad, these conflicts often recur. This recurrence of conflict is particularly important because subsequent disputes within a dyad tend to be more severe than previous ones. However, the factors leading to recurrent conflict remain a matter of debate. While some argue that the settlement of a dispute has a significant impact on post-conflict relations, others argue that the outcome of a dispute is the most important determinant of post-conflict stability. Although evidence has been found to support both views, the relative impact of dispute settlements and outcomes has not been satisfactorily determined. Accordingly, this article simultaneously examines the relationship between settlements, outcomes, and conflict recurrence through survival analyses of the periods of peace following 2,973 dyadic militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 2001. The authors find that although settlement type is an important predictor of recurrent conflict, with imposed settlements being the most stable, outcome type has no significant effects on post-dispute peace duration. The article concludes with a preliminary analysis of the factors that lead to the varying forms of settlement.

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Since states cannot fight without the opportunity to do so, empirical identification of opportunity is important. Unfortunately, previous measures of opportunity-politically relevant dyads, the politically relevant international environment, and regional dyads-are inadequate. I attempt to measure opportunity by developing the concept of a politically active dyad, using contiguity, power status, and alliances as defining characteristics. I then use Braumoeller and Goertz's (2000) methodology for necessary conditions to compare active dyads with previous measures. This test demonstrates that although previous measures are unable to capture opportunity as a necessary condition for international conflict, the concept of politically active dyads does.