This paper was selected for presentation by the OTC Program Comm illee following raview of information contained in an abstract submitted by tha author(s). Conlenls of the paper, as presented, have not been raviewed by the Offshore Tecf1nology Conference and are subject to correction by the author(s). The material, as presented, does not necessarily reflect any pos~ion of the Offshore Technology Conference or ils officers. Electronic raproduction, distribution, or storage of any pert of this peper for commercial purposes without the written consent of the Offshore Technology Conference is prohibited. Pennission to reproduce in print is rastricted to an abslract of not more than 300 words; illustrations may not be copied. The abstract must contain conspicuous acknowledgmenl of where and by whom the paper was presented. AbstractThe . Mars TLP, Shell Offshore Inc.'s second TLP, was designed and fabricated in 30 months, a significant shortening compared to the previous effort. Being on the critical path, the schedule for the hull provided a large portion of the time savings by overlapping the design and fabrication schedule, simplifying the systems, revamping the approach to quality assurance, executing a record setting dry transport, and more. This paper examines each timesaving idea, describes the steps involved as well as the potential benefits and risks, and evaluates the outcome with respect to its actual time compressing value.The items documented in this paper will be of interest to designers, project management, and fabricators involved in the execution of large scale projects.

TX 75083-3836, U.S.A., fax 01-972-952-9435. AbstractThe 2005 hurricane season will be forever remembered for the destruction delivered upon the Gulf of Mexico region. The one-two punch from Katrina and Rita battered eastern Texas to western Florida, causing massive damage and changed the course of life for millions. Due to planned evacuation of platforms in the Gulf, loss of life was avoided. However, the offshore oil and gas industry experienced the fury of these storms, with fixed and floating production structures, drilling rigs, and even pipelines suffering under the powerful winds and tall waves. The industry response was immediate in its efforts to ensure safety, bring relief to those affected in the community, and restore normalcy to the critical operations as quickly as possible. As the recovery efforts continue both onshore and offshore, the longer-term meaning of these events is beginning to be debated. Were Rita and Katrina extremely rare occurrences? Do these two hurricanes, together with Ivan in 2004, signal a need for recalibration of the design extremes? What changes are required to the way we work? Are the applicable codes, specifications, and recommended practices still appropriate? Has the risk been properly vetted in the new context of relatively few, but highly productive infrastructure points in the deepwater, and is it consistent from reservoir to refinery? Should temporarily moored rigs be better secured? The answer to these questions will significantly affect development decisions and the regulations under which work is executed in the future. A panel session is presented with members representing a broad swath of the industry to discuss the various stakeholders' response and potential changes in our characterization of the offshore Gulf of Mexico environment and the application of that new profile to the design and operation of oil and gas infrastructure. PrefaceThis manuscript, while not necessarily representing the opinions of the panelists, is intended to set the stage for a panel discussion on "The Gulf under Siege, The Effects of Katrina and Rita and the Future of the Gulf after Katrina and Rita" scheduled for Tuesday, May 2, 2006 at the Offshore

The Libra project is exploring and developing a very large deposit of oil and gas in the pre-salt area of Santos Basin, 100 miles offshore Brazil's coastline. Five companies have come together in a consortium together with Pré-sal Petróleo SA (PPSA) to develop this area under the country's first Production Sharing Contract (PSC). While still in the exploration phase, the project has been moving at a rapid pace, creating full field development scenarios, drilling wells, developing a system to collect dynamic reservoir information, and preparing for the initiation of its first production FPSO project. Ultimately, the field could see the drilling of nearly a hundred deepwater wells and the installation of several very large FPSOs. The area will be active with seismic, drilling, construction, production, installation and support vessels for many years. By applying industry safety statistics to the large number of man-hours required to bring these plans to life, the potential for fatalities, Lost Time Accidents (LTI's) and other HSE incidences associated with the project can be statistically extrapolated. With these figures in mind, Project Leadership embarked upon a program to substantially improve safety performance with an objective to not only develop this rare field efficiently, but to establish a legacy of exceptional HSE performance. Now three years into Libra's exploration and development, and already exceeding 20 million man-hours expended, this paper seeks to share the steps taken to improve the HSE Culture of the Libra team and the performance of its contractors and subcontractors. Examples of physical changes in specifications to improve process safety, and changes in leadership behavior will be cited. The paper will discuss the successes, challenges, and future opportunities, in the hope that broader discussion of these efforts will assist this project and the industry to achieve project objectives while assuring safe working environments.

Deepwater opportunities exist around the globe. Beyond the commonality of water depth however, each opportunity comes with its own unique set of requirements. Providing deepwater services worldwide demands flexible processes and the ability to develop and deploy a variety of development systems. SIEP Inc. provides deepwater services to Shell's Operating Units around the world. SIEP has three deepwater projects currnetly underway, each employing a different surface structure. In addition, innovative new generation production systems are under development. This paper will look at the various configurations, and explore the technical and economic issues key to their selection. Introduction Successful deepwater development depends on an experienced team using a systems approach to select a field development concept. Although this paper will focus on surface systems, a systems approach to production system selection must integrate subsurface and surface expertise. The maturation of subsurface understanding must keep pace with surface system selection so that development systems can be based on reasonably mature characterization of a prospect and thus permit estimation of overall prospect value. Estimation of prospect value in terms of relevant performance indicators is the key to selection of a good development option. In addition to the basic requirement of subsurface and surface integration, all surface systems including well delivery, subsea systems, flowlines, structural systems, facilities, export and operations must be considered simultaneously. To be done well, experienced technical staff with the proper tools are required. Improvement in performance results when the staff is in a position to transfer knowledge from one project to the next. Realization of the need to assemble multi-disciplined teams and to build from project experience led Shell to form Deepwater Services (SDS). This organization provides technical support to Shell operating units world-wide that have interest in deepwater acreage. Providing deepwater services around the world demands flexible processes and the ability to deploy a variety of development systems. Key Performance Indicators Identification of key performance indicators or measures of goodness is perhaps the most important aspect of successful system selection. Typical performance indicators are:Financial value to operatorTime to first productionFinancial value to other stakeholdersFinancial exposureAdaptability (the ability to deal with uncertain fluids, rates, temperatures, etc.)Sustainability (Domestic content, local impact, energy efficiency, etc.)Strategic or infrastructure valueRobustness (the ability to respond to resource uncertainty) Financial value to the operator and partners is frequently the primary indicator of system performance. A broader set of indicators will generally be necessary for optimal system selection. Once these indicators are chosen a process must be established for each indicator that can measure the performance of a system in a way that can be used to compare options. Strategic Position Identifying a strategic or philosophical position with regard to trade-offs that generally have broad or fuzzy optima is also an important part of successful system selection. These trade-offs include:CAPEX vs. OPEXStandardization vs. ImprovementProven Technology vs. Innovative TechnologyMinimum Capacity vs. Future Capacity

Thls paper was selected for presentallon by the OTC Program Committee follomng revlew of ~ntormatlon contamed In an abstract submlned by the author(s) Contents of the paper, as presented have not been reviewed by the Offshore Technology Conference and are subject to correction by the authors(s) The materlal as presented, does not necessarily reflect any posltlon of the Onsnore Technology Conference or 11s otllcers Eleclronlc reproduct~on. d~str~butlon. or storage of any pan of thls paper for commercial purposes mthout the wrltlen consent of the Onshore Technology Conference IS prohlblted Permlss~on to reproduce In print IS restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words, lllustratlons may not be copledThe abstract must conta~n consplcucus acknowledgment of where and by whom the paper was presented Abstract After completion of fabrication and prior to installation of the Auger tension leg platform (TLP), the designers became concerned that the hull's ring stiffening might not be adequately braced against lateral-torsional buckling under hydrostatic pressure. Such a condition for stiffened shells was not clearly covered by ex~sting design codes. The primary code under which Auger columns were designed, API Bulletin 2U, provided guidelines for compactness, but nothing on the allowable unsupported length of the compression flange. L,.. Furthermore, it was unclear if the notion of L, was applicable to a circular member. Insufficient capacity would mean retrofitting more than 2500 tripping brackets and delaying installation.A finite element analysis procedure was developed at EWI to evaluate the capacity of the hull to resist buckling in the asbuilt arrangement. The modeled hull structure was stiffened by either circumferential rings and stringers or circumferential rlngs only. The analysis incorporated fabrication tolerances for out-of-roundness, axial offset, and web tilt of the circumferential stiffening rings.Models with different combinations of fabrication tolerances were loaded by hydrostatic pressure, axial load, or both. The maximum sustainable pressures were computed and compared to the design pressure. The analysis results indicate that the cylinders with only the circumferential stiffeners (such as analysis are compared with the requirements in API 2U. which is among the most comprehensive code available in the design of stiffened cylinders. The degree of conservatism embodied in API 2U is examined based on the comparison.