Management Compare the approaches of the top 10 operating companies around the world to tackling the asset integrity challenge and you will find many similarities. Whether in the models used to identify risks or the approaches used to manage them, the industry thinking has evolved to a point at which most agree on the fundamental elements of how to approach integrity management. Look closer and you might find some more commonalities. The reasons asset integrity management strategies often fail to achieve the expected results are also often the same from operator to operator. So what are these reasons, and how can you ensure you are building them into your implementation strategy to ensure that you do not repeat them? There are 10 reasons why integrity management implementations often fail. Trying to tackle integrity in isolation. Perhaps the most common reason asset integrity strategies fail is integrity specialists trying to achieve integrity in isolation. Integrity is not a subject that thrives in a silo—it requires the entire business to be aware, on board, and supporting of a unified effort. Staffers need to know how integrity affects their daily job, and they need to be encouraged, cajoled, instructed, and motivated to ensure that they are working together. Different groups have different goals, but not caring about others’ goals and complaining about having to do others’ work demonstrates a silo mentality. If that type of silo mentality exists, there will be problems in implementing integrity management. Losing sight of process, people, and plant. It may seem obvious, but an asset integrity plan is an extremely complex undertaking with many moving parts and even more stakeholders involved in its successful execution. Recognizing that there are many reasons why asset integrity implementations do not achieve the results expected of them is an important starting point. Problems are not confined to one particular area of an integrity implementation and can just as easily emerge in either the process, the people, or the plant components that make up an integrated integrity management program. Focus too narrowly on one area and you can be sure problems will emerge elsewhere. The key to implementation is the effective working together of these three components and ensuring that checks and balances exist at every stage.

Corrosion and stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) tests were performed on aluminum drillpipe Alloy 2014-T6 in a waterbased, low-solids, nondispersed (LSND) drilling mud. Variables examined included chloride concentration, temperature, state of aeration, and effects of galvanic coupling to tool-joint steel. Electrochemical corrosion test results suggested that the aluminum alloy has adequate corrosion resistance to at least 71°C [160 0 P], even when it is galvanically coupled to steel in aerated muds. However, SCC susceptibility of the alloy in aerated muds was clearly demonstrated by slow-strain-rate and rising-stress-intensity/SCC tests. SCC did not occur in deaerated muds. We concluded that oxygen scavenging and monitoring are important to the successful performance of aluminum alloy drillstrings in chloride-containing, water-based, LSND drilling muds. These conclusions were confirmed by excellent field performance. IntroductionA highly deviated well (Fig, I) was recently drilled from a fixed offshore platform. The well was kicked off at 427 m [1,400 ft], and angle was built at a rate of 1.5°/30 m [1.5°1100 ft] to an inclination of 58° from vertical at 1615 m [5,300 ft] measured depth (MD) and 1416 m [4,846 ft] true vertical depth (TVD). The inclination angle was held at 58° to 1640 m [5,380 ft] MD and 1429 m [4,688 ft] TVD, where 340-mm [13ra-in.] casing was set. Drilling continued below the 340-mm [l3ra-in.] casing shoe, holding the inclination angle between 57 and 60° to 2830 m [9,285 ft] MD and 2054 m [6,739 ft] TVD, where 245-mm [9%-in.] casing was set. As will be explained later, continued drilling of the well required that sections of the steel drillstring be replaced with aluminum drillpipe. Thus, at the 245-mm [9%-in.] casing point, approximately 1372 m [4,500 ft] of 127-mm [5-in.] aluminum drillpipe was substituted for the steel pipe used earlier. The aluminum pipe was positioned immediately above the heavyweight drillpipe of the bottornhole assembly (BHA). The remainder of the drillstring above the aluminum drillpipe to surface was 127-mm [5-in.] steel drillpipe. Drilling continued below the 245-mm [9%-in.] casing shoe with the combined aluminum/steel drillstring, with the inclination angle held at about 59° to 3155 m [10,351 ft] MD and 2206 m [7,236 ft] TVD. At this point, an additional 457 m [1,500 ft] of steel drillpipe was removed from the drillstring and replaced with 127mm [5-in.] aluminum drillpipe in the same manner as described earlier. Drilling then continued at an inclination angle between 58 and 64° to the final total depth (TD) of 4007 m [13,145 ft] MD and 2635 m [8,645 ft] TVD. The total departure at this final TD was 2642 m [8,667 ft] from the surface location. The aluminum pipe used in this project was fitted with intemalflush, steel tool joints. 1 Approximately 250 joints (2286 m [7,500 ft]) of the aluminum drillpipe were obtained on a rental basis. Of these, 191 joints were new and 59 joints were used but in premium condition. The seamless drillpipe was specified as Alloy 2014-T6, with ...

TX 75083-3836, U.S.A., fax 01-972-952-9435.Abstract bp Trinidad and Tobago has a mature offshore oil infrastructure and a growing, highly valuable gas resource. The merger of bp and Amoco caused an examination of the operations and facilities through a new set of eyes; particularly those from the North Sea who had lived through the loss of Piper Alpha. This paper outlines how this operator took the lessons from the North Sea and applied them in a pragmatic way to existing assets in a very different country.

An analysis was made by Amoco Norway Oil Company on methods to improve the on-line availability of deluge firewater systems on the offshore platforms at the Valhall Field. It was concluded that a major change in materials for firewater system construction was required. Fiberglass reinforced plastic (FRP) piping components were proposed asan alternative to existing carbon-steel dry deluge firewater systems. Advantages of FRP include enhanced safety through superior corrosion resistance and consequent improved system availability. Additional benefits are anticipated reduced installation and maintenance cost. A program was developed in cooperation with the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) todemonstrate suitability of the material. To verify survivability of FRP under various worst case accident scenarios, the following tasks were identified: a risk assessment study to establish functional requirements and acceptance criteria; a verification explosion and fire testing program, and the development of detailed specifications and quality assurance systems. Performance of these tasks clearly demonstrated the acceptability of fire protected, insulated FRP piping for dry deluge firewater systems at Valhall. Based on this work, Amoco Norway obtained NPD consent to install fire insulated FRP piping in this service. Complete system retrofit has been preceded by offshore installation of a prototype dry deluge system. Experiences to date indicate the approach is an effective method of reducing costs while enhancing offshore safety. INTRODUCTION Deluge firewater systems are an important type offire protection used on wellhead and process areas of offshore platforms. For operational reasons, the majority of piping in these systems are maintained dry, with open spray nozzles and sprinkler heads. The dry systems are separated from pressurized wet systems by deluge valves (often in duplicate), which open to flood dry systems and create deluge upon detection of fire and/or high gas levels. As shown in Figure 1, the amounts of water released by deluge are impressive. Dry deluge firewater systems are found throughoutnearly all platform areas, with many kilometers of piping used for typical offshore platforms. Dry piping sizes are predominantly less than 200 mm (8 inch) in nominal diameter, with smaller sizes suchas 50 mm (2 inch) representing the majority of piping. Materials of construction have traditionally been carbon-steels. Because the systems often utilize seawater and are continuously exposed to the hostile offshore environment, internal corrosion of piping is common. This leads not only to loss of wall thickness, but to blocking of spray nozzles and sprinkler heads by corrosion products and scales. Amoco Norway Oil Company began operations at theValhall Field in the southwest Norwegian sector of the North Sea in 1982. Deluge firewater systems on drilling and process platforms of the type described above had been installed. Since field start-up, significant plugging of nozzles and sprinkler heads by internal corrosion products has been observed about every two years.

No abstract