To address questions about human memory's dependence on the coincidental environmental contexts in which events occur, we review studies of incidental environmental context-dependent memory in humans and report a meta-analysis.Our theoretical approach to the issue stems from Glenberg' s (1997) contention that introspective thought (e.g., remembering, conceptualizing) requires cognitive resources normally used to represent the immediate environment. We propose that if tasks encourage processing of noncontextual information (i.e., introspective thought) at input and/or at test, then both learning and memory will be less dependent on the ambient environmental contexts in which those activities occur. The meta-analysis showed that across all studies, environmental context effects were reliable, and furthermore, that the use of noncontextual cues during learning (overshadowing) and at test (outshining), as well as mental reinstatement of appropriate context cues at test, all reduce the effect of environmental manipulations. We conclude that environmental context-dependent memory effects are less likely to occur under conditions in which the immediate environment is likely to be suppressed.

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In three experiments we tested the conformity hypothesis-that subjects' ideas would conform to examples they had been shown-by using a creative generation paradigm in which subjects imagined and sketched new exemplars of experimenter-defined categories. Designs made by subjects who had first seen three examples of ideas were compared with those of control subjects, who received no examples. In all three experiments, the designs of subjects who had seen the examples were more likely to contain features of the examples. This conformity effect did not significantly decrease in Experiment 2, when a 23-min task was interpolated between viewing the examples and generating related ideas. The hypothesis that the observed conformity effects may have been caused by subjects' assumptions that they should try to generate ideas similar to the examples was refuted in Experiment 3; explicitly instructing subjects to create ideas that were very different from the examples did not decrease conformity to the examples, and instructing them to conform to the examples significantly increased conformity. The results show that recent experience can lead to unintentional conformity, constraining the generation of creative ideas.

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