This paper reviews the diverse literature on corporate political activity (CPA) and develops a framework that details and integrates existing research in this field. A systematic analysis of extant CPA literatures is conducted to order them into domains that have implications for organizational performance. The paper is structured into three such domain emphases, which require further research investigation: resources and capabilities focus; institutional focus; and political environment focus. The contribution of each to an understanding of CPA in pursuit or defence of corporate competitive advantage is discussed. The authors also suggest that the internationalization of business, including the more recent emergence of developing country economies and companies, presents scholars with the challenge of understanding CPA in more varied institutional settings. CPA practices continue to expand as commerce goes increasingly global and, consequently, involves a wider array of political actors and institutions. The paper contributes by increasing the clarity of CPA classification, reflecting on the implications of a multi-polar world for CPA research and advancing future agendas for scholars in this research community.Peer reviewe

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The issue of whether a firm's ‘home’ environment influences its non‐market activities in a ‘host’ country is being increasingly discussed in the international business literature. In this paper, we use institutional and organizational imprinting theories to argue that multinational enterprises (MNEs) founded in countries with stronger regulatory institutions are likely to spend more on lobbying in a host country compared to MNEs founded in countries with weaker regulatory institutions. We also argue that this effect is moderated by the MNE's overall experience, its experience within the host country and its technological intensity. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 378 foreign MNEs (among the largest 500) operating in the USA, spanning the eight year period 2006−2013, and representing 29 home countries. Our results support our hypothesis on the relationship between home‐institutional imprinting and overseas lobbying expenditure, as described above. Our results also support our arguments that MNEs’ overall experience and technological intensity reduce the imprinting effect of home institutions on lobbying expenditure; however, our moderating effect of host‐country experience on this relationship is not supported.

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In this paper we study the on‐going trade dispute between Canada and Brazil on export subsidies in the aircraft industry and the reasons for its escalation. This is a peculiar case of strategic trade policy insofar as the good, i.e. regional jets, is heavily dependent on sub‐systems that are imported in the two countries. The hypothesis that the dispute solely derives from the search for rents and externalities is therefore incomplete. Without downplaying the role of interest politics, we argue that in both countries ideas about the goals of trade policy have an important place in explaining why this dispute drags on. For Canada, the belief in a rules‐based trading regime has led it to strongly oppose violations, while insecurity about its competitiveness has led to a variety of government schemes to support firms in advanced sectors like aerospace. For Brazil, its place as a leader of the developing world acted as a rallying point for government and firms alike. The research also argues that the WTO process has actually made a resolution of the dispute more difficult by making it too costly for firms and countries to comply with the costs of losing.