The COVID-19 crisis has shown that European countries remain poorly prepared for dealing and coping with health crises and for responding in a coordinated way to a severe influenza pandemic. Within the European Union, the response to the COVID-19 pandemic has a striking diversity in its approach. By focusing on Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy-countries that represent different models of administrative systems in Europe-the analysis shows that major similarities and convergences have become apparent from a crosscountry perspective. Moreover, coping with the crisis has been first and foremost an issue of the national states, whereas the European voice has been weak. Hence, the countries' immediate responses appear to be corona-nationalistic, which we label "coronationalism." This essay shows the extent to which the four countries adopted different crisis management strategies and which factors explain this variance, with a special focus on their institutional settings and administrative systems.

Like many Western European countries, Belgium and the Netherlands have been strongly hit by COVID-19. Almost simultaneously, the virus spread, caused a relatively high number of infections and severe lockdown measures were imposed; however, at the same time, the crisis management response has been sufficiently different to justify a systematic comparative analysis. We start with the premise that decisions made on the basis of incomplete information show the true nature of governments’ response to a crisis, which is conditioned by legacies arising from the past and organizational cultures, existing and new governance structures, and strategies used by specific actors. We show that the difference in crisis management echoes the countries’ different types of consociationalism, though also that Belgian federalism and Dutch decentralism impeded a truly coherent response. The cost of coordinating different government levels made a uniform approach difficult too. Actor strategies attempting to exploit the crisis seem to have influenced the response the least but did have an impact on perceptions of the response. Points for practitioners The article unravels how the governments in the Low Countries responded to the COVID-19 challenge in the first half of 2020. It allows practitioners to better understand that under circumstances of an imminent crisis, specific governance structures matter. It also reveals that the cost of coordination between the federated and the federal level turned out to be quite high in Belgium. In the Netherlands, a lot of autonomy was left to federated and local authorities. This too impeded a more coherent approach. COVID-19 certainly offers possibilities for policymakers to exploit the crisis but opportunities are not always taken.

Despite new challenges like climate change and digitalization, global and regional organizations recently went through turbulent times due to a lack of support from several of their member states. Next to this crisis of multilateralism, the COVID-19 pandemic now seems to question the added value of international organizations for addressing global governance issues more specifically. This article analyses this double challenge that several organizations are facing and compares their ways of managing the crisis by looking at their institutional and political context, their governance structure, and their behaviour during the pandemic until June 2020. More specifically, it will explain the different and fragmented responses of the World Health Organization, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund/World Bank. With the aim of understanding the old and new problems that these international organizations are trying to solve, this article argues that the level of autonomy vis-a-vis the member states is crucial for understanding the politics of crisis management. Points for practitioners As intergovernmental bodies, international organizations require authorization by their member states. Since they also need funding for their operations, different degrees of autonomy also matter for reacting to emerging challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The potential for international organizations is limited, though through proactive and bold initiatives, they can seize the opportunity of the crisis and partly overcome institutional and political constraints.

This article provides a conceptual framework for the analysis of COVID-19 crisis governance in the first half of 2020 from a cross-country comparative perspective. It focuses on the issue of opportunity management, that is, how the crisis was used by relevant actors of distinctly different administrative cultures as a window of opportunity. We started from an overall interest in the factors that have influenced the national politics of crisis management to answer the question of whether and how political and administrative actors in various countries have used the crisis as an opportunity to facilitate, accelerate or prevent changes in institutional settings. The objective is to study the institutional settings and governance structures, (alleged) solutions and remedies, and constellations of actors and preferences that have influenced the mode of crisis and opportunity management. Finally, the article summarizes some major comparative findings drawn from the country studies of this Special Issue, focusing on similarities and differences in crisis responses and patterns of opportunity management. Points for practitioners With crises emerging in ever shorter sequences of time, governing turbulence and using crises for strategic institutional decisions has become an increasingly important issue for policymakers. Aiming at effective and proportionate responses, policymakers must take the institutional conditions, administrative traditions and relevant actor constellations of crisis management into account, which are key to learn from other countries’ experiences. Comparing these experiences and analyzing the politics of crisis governance from a cross-country perspective may help policymakers to identify strengths and weaknesses of their own national/regional approaches and to seize crisis-related windows of opportunity for institutional reforms at the national and international levels.