During recent years, the concept of European civil society has gained increasing popularity. The European Institutions themselves have developed a discourse on civil society and civil dialogue. Institutional interests have shaped this discourse. Reframing the normative context for EU democracy, this discourse suits some institutions better than others. In particular, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Commission have made recourse to it; the former to redefine its proper role and combat the risk of marginalisation within the European institutional set-up; the latter first to build support for policy initiatives in the social sphere and subsequently to respond to the legitimacy crisis of the Brussels' bureaucracy. These institutional interests have inspired a conceptualisation of civil society as 'functional participation' and 'functional representation' rather than as 'politicisation' or 'decentralisation'. However, while the Commission and the ESC have had some success in selling their discourse, to be successful in the longer run some problematic assumptions of the discourse should be tackled and both the different rationales for civil society involvement as well as the multi-level character of European civil society and European policymaking should be taken into account.

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The EU's new approach to policy evaluation is characterised by a focus on closing the policy cycle (linking ex ante and ex post appraisal) and by applying evaluation to all types of policy intervention, whether expenditure or regulatory policy. This article analyses the main features and challenges of this new approach. It first studies the conceptual and interdisciplinary challenge of such an encompassing approach to evaluation. It then assesses the new approach in the light of four key objectives of ex ante and ex post appraisal; ensuring evidence and learning; accountability, transparency and participation; policy coherence; and reducing the regulatory burden.

The European social dialogue provides for the signing of collective agreements between employers’ associations and trade unions organised at the European level. Effectiveness to a great extent depends on the shadow of hierarchy, which is cast by the threat of legislative action and by ensuring implementation of collective agreements through public intervention. The need for the shadow is illustrated by the initial priority given to statutory agreements and the problems of implementation of more recent non-statutory agreements. While the shadow of hierarchy is important to ensure the effectiveness of social dialogue, social dialogue procedures are not characterised by strong principal-agent relationships. In particular, non-statutory agreements stem from a bottom-up private sector-inspired tradition of industrial relations. Even in the case of statutory agreements, the European Commission, as principal, does not appoint the agent and the delegation is implicit rather than explicit. Moreover, successful delegation entirely depends on whether the agents reach agreement between themselves. While the Commission could revoke delegation if Community objectives are not realised and by setting statutory criteria for implementing an agreement, its room for manoeuvre is limited for reasons of political pragmatism.