This study explored perceptions, experiences and opportunities for the occupational safety and health professional (OSHP) as a result of COVID-19. Using qualitative methods, interviews took place with OSHPs in two organisations to understand how their role developed during the pandemic. Additionally, seven focus groups were organised and met virtually, using the Zoom platform, each addressing a different topic identified by the researchers. Participants (n = 45) from 10 different countries were distributed among the focus groups. Topics were separated into four themes: impact on the workplace; the psychosocial dynamic; medical and health issues and occupational safety and health (OSH) issues. Results were subsequently divided into seven action categories and compared with the findings from the organisational interviews. Comparison pointed to an expanded role for the OSHP including business continuity, resilience and wellbeing in addition to assessing and controlling risks emerging during the pandemic. There is also the need for a means to adequately disseminate trustworthy information. Results indicated that there was no single ‘average’ role of the OSHP, demonstrating essential contributions as a member of the management team. Results also stressed that the pandemic carried three health-related co-morbidities, stress, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and burnout. Directions for future research included: the education of the OSHP to support a move away from compliance towards risk management; determining how mental health issues in organisations should be managed; expanded roles for OSHPs within business; and implications for professional bodies, membership institutions and academia in supporting the above-mentioned emerging roles.

The Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development has set up an information system on occupational exposure (ISOE) received at nuclear power stations throughout the world. The third annual report produced by NEA on the data held on ISOE has recently been published. Data from 16 countries are included in the report, mainly from OECD countries, but some non-OECD countries are included through membership of IAEA, which is a co-sponsor of ISOE. The 1993 data are analysed and trends are given for the period 1969 to the end of 1993. At the end of 1993, data for 339 reactors were included in the database, which represents 78% of the operating reactors in the world. About half of these supplied data directly to ISOE, and other data for the report were obtained from annual reports produced by the utilities. The data are well presented, mainly in tabular and graphical form. The ISOE information system consists of three databases: NEA 1, NEA 2 and NEA 3. NEA 1 contains radiological data in the form of collective dose, and individual dose distributions, which can be analysed by country or type of reactor; these data are the main source of information for this report. However, only collective dose is analysed in the report and not individual dose data. NEA 2 includes information on dose control techniques and work management, whereas NEA 3 contains details of specific operations and experience gained in radiation protection procedures. All three databases are to be developed further. The total collective dose from all reactors in 1993 was 585 man Sv, which was 6% less than in 1992. This fall is a continuation of a steady reduction since the mid-1980s, there being a maximum of 913 man Sv in 1983. That peak was mainly caused by back-fitting work in PWR reactors required after the Three Mile Island incident. In recent years also, increased emphasis on dose minimisation has gradually reduced the annual collective dose. The collective dose per unit power generated in 1993 was 0.32 man Sv per Tw h; this is the lowest value achieved in any year for utilities on the database. The report gives other analyses such as average outage period for refuelling: Finland was lowest with an average of 2 to 3 weeks and Japan was the highest at around 20 weeks. The penultimate chapter gives brief reports from each participating country on the principal events that affected the collective dose in 1993, and shows how multifarious are the influences on this quantity from various plant operations. These national reports also demonstrate how universal is the drive towards minimising occupational exposure.

Previous reports by NCRP have covered various aspects of patient exposure from, and practical advice on, the use of radioisotopes in medical laboratories. This report deals with the exposure of four main groups: staff in nuclear medicine laboratories, other hospital staff, patients and other members of the public. The total number of nuclear medicine procedures in the United States at the start of the decade was about 100 million, some 90% of these were radioimmunoassay investigations, and the remainder were in vivo administrations of radioactive materials. The number of in vivo nuclear medicine procedures increased by about 16% from 6.4 million to 7.4 million from 1980 to 1990. This was less than the projected 8% per year increase expected over that period because of the virtual disappearance of some techniques, such as the use of for brain scintigraphy and sulphur colloid liver imaging. Computed tomography and magnetic resonance imaging have largely replaced those techniques. Some other techniques such as positron emission tomography for mapping certain functions of the brain show an increasing trend. Radionuclides used for organ imaging, for example , emit penetrating gamma radiation and give rise to occupational exposure of nuclear medicine staff and other persons in the vicinity of patients undergoing diagnosis or treatment. The dose to a patient from a nuclear medicine diagnostic procedure is typically in the range 0.1 mSv to 10 mSv. The dose rate at 1 m from a typical diagnostic patient is about , after administration of 0.74 GBq of . Therapeutic administrations, for example 3.7 GBq of , will give rise to a dose rate of about at 1 m from the patient, who will normally need to be segregated to reduce the exposure of other persons in the vicinity. Samples, such as blood, taken from a patient also represent a source of staff exposure and the report discusses the requirements for shielding these samples. Work involving the preparation and assay of radiopharmaceuticals tends to be associated with the highest occupational exposures in this field, and can give rise to annual doses up to about 5 mSv. However, doses to hands and fingers can range up to the annual limit of 500 mSv and various shielding devices can be used to reduce extremity doses. However, the majority of workers in nuclear medicine departments who are not directly handling radiopharmaceuticals receive very low exposures, typically well below 1 mSv. Members of the patient's family may sometimes be in close proximity to the patient after the administration of radiopharmaceuticals. Studies cited in the report suggest doses up to about per procedure might be received by these individuals. To estimate the radiological impact of these procedures on the general public it is assumed that a dose of is received by a member of the public from each in vivo procedure and the annual per caput dose to the US population, not including patient dose, is evaluated as . The risks represented by the occupational doses received from this work...