As of September 2006, non-directed donation of kidneys and other tissues and organs is permitted in the UK under the new Human Tissue Acts. At the same time as making provision for psychiatric and clinical assessment of so-called “altruistic” donations to complete strangers, the Acts intensify assessments required for familial, genetically related donations, which will now require the same level as genetically unrelated but “emotionally” connected donations by locally based independent assessors reporting to the newly constituted Human Tissue Authority. But there will also need to be considerable reflection on the criteria for “stranger donation”, which may lead us to a new understanding of the moral economy of altruistic organ donation, no matter how mixed the motives of the donor may be. This paper looks at some of the issues that will have to be accommodated in such a framework.

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In mid-summer 1997, just as the United States National Cancer Institute was acknowledging that the nuclear bomb tests at the Nevada Test Site may ultimately cause up to 75,000 cases of thyroid cancer in people who were living in the USA in the 1950s and 1960s, the Australian authorities were mooting the possibility that the Maralinga test sites in South Australia should become a tourist attraction. Some Aboriginal tribal leaders welcomed this proposed use when the 20 million Pounds 'clean-up' being paid for by the United Kingdom government as some compensation for using the area for its weapons tests in the 1950s and 1960s is completed. This paper surveys the attempts to clean up the site of UK nuclear weapons tests in the 1950s, not least by attempting to vitrify vast tracts of desert.

An inter-comparison of cases of multiple myeloma among UK participants in the UK's atmospheric atomic and nuclear weapons tests ascertained by direct follow up methods detected at least a third more cases than a strategy relying solely on data linkage between the Office of National Statistics and the Service Records Offices. These finding have implications for the conduct and robustness of follow up studies of long term health effects among participants in nuclear weapons tests. In June 1999, Roff reported 1 that 54 cases of multiple myeloma had been identified among the approximately 22 000 veterans of the UK's atmospheric atomic and nuclear weapons tests programmes in response to a postal self administered questionnaire to the approximately 2200 members of the British Nuclear Tests Veterans Association. The study had generated considerable publicity which itself prompted some veterans to report their cases to the researcher. Since this was more than twice the number of cases of multiple myeloma reported in the second study 2 of the veterans that had been conducted by the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) under commission from the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the issue was raised whether the data collection strategy used by the NRPB-a linkage between the Office of National Statistics registries of cancer incidence and mortality with records of participants in the weapons tests drawn from the Service Records Office-was adequate. The NRPB maintained that it had captured 85% of the cohort, although it acknowledged that figure might have fallen to around 74% for Royal Air Force (RAF) veterans. The NRPB accepted that if more than 15% of the multiple myeloma cases were ascertained among veterans not included in the 85% reported in their studies, their results could not be considered representative of the full cohort.If the level of under-ascertainment proved to be equal in both the study cohort (potentially exposed to ionising radiation) and controls (probably unexposed group) the validity of the methodology would have been reasonable, but as the following data indicate, the under-ascertainment rate in the 15% of the study population was probably at least 30% or twice the rate in the 85% for whom data were analysed. METHODSIn response to this situation, the Ministry of Defence announced that a third study of the nuclear tests would be undertaken by the NRPB. The study 3 4 duly commenced in December 1999 and included an inter-comparison of the cases detected by the NRPB and those reported by the present researcher (who had secured consent of the subjects or their relicts to share the information with the NRPB). Criteria for eligibilityThe population of the third NRPB study 3 4 is essentially the same as that in the second analysis.2 Contemporary records held by the MoD had been searched to identify test participants among servicemen and civilian employees of the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and Atomic Energy Research Establishment. These men had visited at least one of the test locations (Monte Bello I...

The response of the Israeli civilian population to the Scud missile attacks and the possibility of chemical and biological warfare during the 1991 Gulf War have been monitored in various contexts. The present article reviews the findings and their implications for civilian defence planning in the event of a reprise. In 1991 the most controversial policy was the insistence that Israeli families prepare a sealed room in which to sit out the Iraqi attacks. The evidence suggests that in some instances this may have been counterproductive, even during relatively short periods of immurement.