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The ubiquity of the Internet and explosive growth in wireless networking in recent years increasingly urge the demand to support mobility within the Internet, which is what Mobile IP aims to provide. This paper is concerned with the security aspect of the registration protocol in Mobile IP. In this paper, we show that despite the use of authenticated registration messages and replay protection, the current registration protocol suffers from a possible replay attack. The paper also analyzes a proposed extension of Mobile IP that aims to provide public-key based authentication. We show some drawbacks in its protocol design and then propose our own new secure authentication protocol that employs only minimal use of public key cryptography. Despite its practicality, our new protocol provides a scalable solution for authentication and non-repudiation, while sets only minimal computing and administration cost on the Mobile Node.

Recent years have seen a global adoption of smart mobile devices, particularly those based on Android. However, Android’s widespread adoption is marred with increasingly rampant malware threats. This article gives a survey and taxonomy of existing works that secure Android devices. Based on Android app deployment stages, the taxonomy enables us to analyze schemes that share similar objective and approach and to inspect their key differences. Additionally, this article highlights the limitations of existing works and current challenges. It thus distills the state of the art in Android security research and identifies potential research directions for safeguarding billions (and keep counting) of Android-run devices.

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The problem of malware is greatly reduced if we can ensure that only software from trusted providers is executed. In this paper, we have built a prototype system on Windows which performs authentication of all binaries in Windows to on Windows are made more complex because there are many kinds of binaries besides executables, e.g. DLLs, drivers, ActiveX controls, etc. We combine this with a simple software ID scheme for software management and vulnerability assessment which leverages on trusted infrastructure such as DNS and Certificate Authorities. Our prototype is lightweight and does not need to rely on PKI infrastructure; it does however take advantage of binaries with existing digital signatures. We provide a detailed security analysis of our authentication scheme. We demonstrate that our prototype has low overhead, around 2%, even when all binary code is authenticated.