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PurposeThis study aims to describe and understand performance measurement system (PMS) change in an emerging economy bank.Design/methodology/approachUsing institutional theory as a theoretical lens, the study uses Kasurinen's accounting change model to explain management accounting change as a product of motivators, catalysts and facilitators. The model also focuses on how confusers, frustrators and delayers inhibit PMS change and the role of leaders in the change process. Data were gathered from multiple sources including relevant internal and external documents covering a ten‐year period (1997‐2007), and semi‐structured interviews with managers from different hierarchical levels.FindingsThe bank's PMS experienced two significant changes from 1997 to 2007. While uncertain economic conditions, increasing competition, and pressures to improve performance and enhance accountability motivated changes in the bank's performance measurement system, the major catalysts of change were the financial losses experienced, major regulatory changes, and the appointment of a new board of directors and president. The change leader played an important role in overcoming resistance to change and in ensuring adequate technical support and training was provided to facilitate the change.Practical implicationsBank managers must be aware of the influence of institutional factors on PMSs. In particular, they need to be aware of the factors that can necessitate change (motivators), initiate change (catalysts) and the prevailing conditions required to support change (facilitators) in order to maintain the utility of PMSs.Originality/valueThe paper provides a more detailed insight into the impact of institutional factors on changes in PMSs in the context of an emerging economy, which will assist practitioners in addressing issues concerning PMSs changes in similar contexts.

Purpose-The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into the understanding of the relationship between board involvement and corporate performance within the context of developing countries. Design/methodology/approach-A number of aspects related to board involvement, including board's shareholdings, frequency of board meetings, availability of independent board committees, board size, CEO duality, and CEO is being a promoter, were examined in order to explore their influence on corporate performance measured in terms of earnings per share. The study mainly draws on agency theory, and is supplemented by resource dependence and stewardship theories. Multiple regression analysis is utilized to analyze the data gathered from a sample of 212 publicly listed companies in 20 industries in the Colombo Stock Exchange in Sri Lanka. Findings-Among the aspects of board involvement considered, board's shareholdings, board meetings frequency, independent committees, and CEO duality showed a positive influence on corporate performance. However, two other aspects, namely CEO being a promoter, and the size of corporate boards showed a negative effect. The findings also suggest that the use of multiple theories, rather than depending on a single theory, is more effective in understanding the relationships examined in this study. Further, the study highlights the need to be cautious in utilizing the theories that are more applicable to matured western economies when analyzing issues relating to developing countries. Originality/value-This study makes an original contribution to corporate governance literature by examining the relationship between board involvement and corporate performance in a developing country, namely Sri Lanka. The study also adds to the existing literature by utilizing multiple theories to examine the issue under investigation.

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