No abstract

The effect of violence on people's residential choice remains a debated topic in the literature on crime and conflict. We examine the case of the drug war in Mexico, which dramatically increased the number of homicides since late 2006. Using data from the Mexican Census and labor force surveys, we estimate the impact of violence on migration at the municipal and state levels. To account for the endogeneity of violence, we use kilometers of federal highways interacted with cocaine supply shocks from Colombia as an instrument for the annual homicide rate. We argue that highways are good measures of pre-existing drug distribution networks, and the interaction with supply shocks arising in Colombia captures the time-variant nature of the value of these routes. After controlling for observed and unobserved area level heterogeneity, we find little evidence that increases in homicides have led to out-migration, at the domestic level. We also find little evidence of international migration at the municipal level, but some evidence of it at the state level. Our results show a muted migration response that is incompatible with a story of wide-scale displacement from the violence.JEL Classification: O12, K42, O54, J11

No abstract

Intermarriage between a native and immigrant can affect the household's supply of labor hours. Spouse selectivity on the basis of human capital, distribution of bargaining power, and labor supply coordination within the household can differ by type of marriage and gender of the immigrant-and, consequently, affect how spouses supply labor to the market. Using the 2010 American Community Survey, a household labor market specialization index is created. Raw two-limit Tobit estimates show lower specialization in intermarried households for both genders, compared to their intra-married counterparts. The finding for intermarried female households is reversed, and gender-based specialization increases, when controls for human capital are introduced. The role of immigrant education for both intermarried men and women is underscored-specialization differences, by type of marriage, are insignificant when the immigrant has post-college education. At lower levels of immigrant education, native spouses supply more market labor. Intermarriage may also skew bargaining power in favor of native husbands in immigrant female households.JEL Classifications: J1, J16, J12, J22

The impact of intermarriage with natives, on labor market outcomes of immigrants, is not homogeneous across ethnic groups. Wages of Asian women are compared with non‐Asians. Both ordinary least squares and instrumental variables estimates of the effects of intermarriage on the wages of Asian women are negative and significant. Non‐Asian women earn a wage premium that becomes insignificant when controls for selection into marriage are introduced. One possible explanation for the intermarriage penalty for Asians is an income effect of having a high‐earning native husband. Intermarriage penalties rise with husband's education. Assimilation patterns of intermarried Asians indicate that they have lower initial wages, market hours, and employment, but exhibit faster rates of growth over their years of stay. The results are robust across Asian subgroups and husband's ethnicity. (JEL J16, J12, J31, J61)