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Numerous jurisdictions provide for statutorycivil liability of directors shouldthey make themselves guiltyof managing thebusiness of a company in a reckless, wrongful or fraudulent manner or engage in insolvent trading. Such provisions can play an important role in protecting the interests of corporate creditors, provided that they are properly formulated.This contribution attempts to determine whether the interests of corporate creditors are adequately protected in terms of such provisions. In South Africa, directors'civil and criminal liability for reckless or fraudulent trading is currently provided for in terms of section 424 of the South African Companies Act. Civil liability of those engaged in knowingly taking part in managing the business of the company fraudulently or recklessly is provided for in terms of subsection (1). However, an analysis of case law on the interpretation of section 424(1) reveals that there are numerous uncertainties regarding the application of this provision. Similar provisions in other jurisdictions also display a number of shortcomings. South African company law has just undergone an extensive review, however, and a Draft Companies Bill of 5 February 2007 was recently publishedfor publiccomment.Theliabilityof directors for recklessor fraudulenttrading is provided for in terms of the proposed section 93(2)(b) of the Draft Companies Bill. A comparison between section 424(1) and section 93(2)(b) indicates that some of the uncertainties that exist in terms of section 424(1) may be resolved by the new provision. Unfortunately, the proposed section 93(2)(b) raises some of its ownquestions andwould furthermore seem to o¡er more limited protection than section 424(1) in certain respects. This unfortunate occurrence will detract from the protection that provisions such as these could a¡ord to the interests of corporate creditors and it is submitted that such provisions should be drafted with great care.

Since the introduction of a whistle-blower awards program by the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2010, securities regulators in other countries, including Canada, have adopted, or are considering adopting, similar programs. For example, in 2016, the Ontario Securities Commission adopted its own whistle-blower award program. Although the primary main reason for these programs is to encourage the reporting of securities violations to the regulator, they could also have an impact on corporate governance. This is because the implementation of such a program may prod companies to design, and then instigate, a more effective internal whistle-blowing system. A truly successful internal whistle-blowing system can enable a company to detect and correct potential wrongdoing before it causes significant harm. This article closely examines this connection between whistle-blowing award programs, companies’ compliance and risk management systems, and how a whistle-blowing award program might well result in more effective internal whistle-blowing systems without the need for a regulator to resort to the imposition of prescriptive rules. As such, this article reflects upon how whistle-blower award programs fit within new governance regulatory theory that challenges traditional “command-and-control-type”regulation in favour of an outcome-driven approach.