We study the effects of physical distance on the acquisition and use of private information in informationally opaque credit markets. Using a unique data set of all loan applications by small firms to a large bank, we show that borrower proximity facilitates the collection of soft information, leading to a trade-off in the availability and pricing of credit, which is more readily accessible to nearby firms albeit at higher interest rates ceteris paribus. Analyzing loan rates and firms' decision to switch lenders provides further evidence for banks' strategic use of private information. However, distance erodes our lender's ability to collect proprietary intelligence and to carve out local captive markets, suggesting that the requisite soft information is primarily local. (JEL G21, L11, L14, D44)Private information and its distribution are among the fundamental forces shaping economic exchange. Agents often devote considerable resources in terms of time, effort, and money to its acquisition in order to gain a strategic advantage in the ensuing transaction, especially by collecting soft information. At the same time, very little is known about the origins, use, and consequences of such subjective intelligence despite its economic importance (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Stein 2002), in part because it has eluded easy categorization so far (but see Petersen 2004). Its defining attributes-it is not readily transferable, verifiable, or interpretable-also imply that it is difficult to identify, measure, and analyze in practice. However, technological progress coupled with operational procedures in commercial lending allow us to overcome these analytic challenges in one particular industry-credit-market transactions inWe thank

Many consumers make poor nancial choices and older adults are particularly vulnerable to such errors. About half of the population between ages 80 and 89 either has dementia or a medical diagnosis of "cognitive impairment without dementia." We study lifecycle patterns in nancial mistakes using a proprietary database that measures ten di erent types of credit behavior. Financial mistakes include suboptimal use of credit card balance transfer o ers, misestimation of the value of one's house, and excess interest rate and fee payments. In a cross-section of prime borrowers, middle-aged adults make fewer nancial mistakes than younger and older adults. We conclude that nancial mistakes follow a Ushaped pattern, with the cost-minimizing performance occurring around age 53. We analyze regulatory regimes that may help individuals avoid making nancial mistakes. Some of these regimes are designed to address the particular challenges faced by older adults, but much of our discussion is relevant for all vulnerable populations. We discuss disclosure, nudges, nancial driving licenses, advanced directives, duciaries, asset safe harbors, ex-post and ex-ante regulatory oversight. Finally, we pose seven questions for future research on cognitive limitations and associated policy responses.

We find that regulators can implement identical rules inconsistently due to differences in their institutional design and incentives, and this behavior may adversely impact the effectiveness with which regulation is implemented. We study supervisory decisions of U.S. banking regulators and exploit a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal and state supervisors to the same bank at exogenously set time intervals. Comparing federal and state regulator supervisory ratings within the same bank, we find that federal regulators are systematically tougher, downgrading supervisory ratings almost twice as frequently as do state supervisors. State regulators counteract these downgrades to some degree by upgrading more frequently. Under federal regulators, banks report worse asset quality, higher regulatory capital ratios, and lower return on assets. Leniency of state regulators relative to their federal counterparts is related to costly outcomes, such as higher failure rates and lower repayment rates of government assistance funds. The discrepancy in regulator behavior is related to different weights given by regulators to local economic conditions and, to some extent, differences in regulatory resources. We find no support for regulator self-interest, which includes ''revolving doors'' as a reason for leniency of state regulators. JEL Codes: G21, G28.

Key Points Question How are benzodiazepines being prescribed, and how have prescribing patterns changed over time? Findings In this serial cross-sectional study of 386 457 ambulatory care visits from 2003 through 2015, the use of benzodiazepines in ambulatory care increased substantially from 3.8% to 7.4% of visits, including coprescribing with other sedating medications. Use among psychiatrists was stable (29.6% vs 30.2%) but increased among all other types of physicians, including primary care physicians (3.6% vs 7.5%), who as a group accounted for about half of all benzodiazepine visits. Meaning In light of increasing death rates associated with benzodiazepine overdose, addressing prescribing patterns may help curb the growing use of benzodiazepines.