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Abstract:The inelastic supply of fossil energy in the international input market precipitates failure of Pigouvian taxation consequent to competition among governments, as imposition of an environmental tax increases (decreases) the marginal cost of domestic (foreign) firms. This paper demonstrates that unless the supply of fossil energy is perfectly elastic, cap-and-trade outperforms Pigouvian taxation in terms of the domestic welfare of adopting countries, and global welfare is maximized when all countries implement the alternative scheme. We further demonstrate that the linkage of permit markets, when the energy supply is sufficiently inelastic, improves global welfare.

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Purpose Unlike the common belief in the so-called “trickle-down effect,” trade-induced output growth in a small open economy does not necessarily improve the domestic welfare of the economy. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the conditions under which the trickle-down effect does not work properly such that the connection between trade-induced output growth and welfare improvement is broken. Design/methodology/approach This paper introduces an inter-sectoral migration barrier in the general equilibrium model and conducts various simulation experiments under reasonable parameter values. Findings This paper demonstrates that subsidizing export industries may raise the total value-added of an economy but deteriorate aggregate welfare. This worsens especially when the supply of non-tradable domestic goods is inelastic, and the demand for them is more substitutable by tradable goods. Practical implications To reinforce the trickle-down effect, it is necessary to facilitate efficient labor reallocation and to induce capitalization in the non-tradable sector. Originality/value That output growth and welfare improvement do not always move in the same direction requires a reappraisal of the former common belief on the trickle-down effect which emphasizes output growth as an indicator of welfare improvement.