Rock's [1] theory ascertains information asymmetry as a primary reason to answer "Why New Issues are Underpriced?" Theoretical construct of this seminal work is based on information asymmetry between various classes of investors. Empirical manifestation of this theoretical explanation is based on considering different proxy measures to quantify the information asymmetry as perceived by various researchers over the past three decades. The growing IPO literature also explained underpricing with the help of agency theory, signaling, behavioural theories etc. Empirical research has identified various determinants of IPO underpricing. The influence of various factors predominantly depends upon country specific regulations, market microstructure and price discovery mechanism. Although many factors have justified the degree of underpricing, controlling for these factors does not completely eliminate the degree of under pricing. The justification of residual underpricing through these factors has limitations in terms of failure to completely explain the IPO underpricing. The paper reviews different factors presented in the extant literature that influence the price discovery mechanism of initial public offerings (IPO) in various economies. We conclude that the degree of underpricing is dynamic and various markets forces interact simultaneously in observing the variation in pricing the new equity issues. This paper points out the significance of regulatory framework in explaining the degree of IPO underpricing.

In this study, we examine whether governance practices brings down agency cost.We find that board size, board attendance, and CEO duality are important governance characteristics that influence the agency cost. We also bring out systematic differences in governance practices of the business group affiliated firms and stand-alone firms. Larger board and proportion of independent director helps in reducing the agency cost for group affiliated firms supporting monitoring hypothesis.On the other hand, the governance structure of stand-alone firms supports commitment hypothesis where we observe that board busyness and CEO duality help in reducing the agency cost.

We evaluate the monitoring and certification hypotheses associated with venture capital (VC) investors involved with Indian listed firms having the potential to influence firm performance. Empirical results of our study do not support monitoring and certification hypotheses associated for VC investors involved in publicly listed firms in India. On the other hand, we find the evidence of value erosion due to the presence of VC investors. The negative effect is justified through the opportunistic behaviour of the investor having a very easy route to exit investment through the secondary market in case of expected underperformance of the firm. The study also reveals that the origin of VC investors does influence firm performance. The results have a significant impact due to the regulatory framework defining the portfolio of VC investors.

PurposeThis study identifies the factors responsible for obtaining price premium on privately placed equity in a developing market.Design/methodology/approachWe examine a unique data set of a special case of private placement of equity, Qualified Institutional Placement (QIP) in India purchased at a premium. The study analyzed 188 equity issues offered between September 2006 and December 2014. On average, we find that QIP issues received a price premium of 4.38%. The study employed binary probit and ordinary least square regression models to analyze the probability and magnitude of the premium.FindingsThe study attributes the price premium of QIP to certification effect through group affiliation, signaling through promoters' ownership and monitoring effect through existing institutional investors. These factors influence the probability of premium for QIP issues. However, group affiliation and institutional ownership do not significantly influence the magnitude of the premium.Originality/valueThe private placement of equity is usually offered at a discount. Our findings contribute to the existing literature by evaluating the premium obtained on private placement as a unique scenario in emerging market supported through certification hypothesis, monitoring hypothesis and signaling.

We examine the cost implications of using corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a vehicle to build sustainable corporate ethical identity (CEI). CSR investment is recognized as one of the effective channels to promote a firm's CEI. However, excessive CSR could divert resources from other strategic projects, and shareholder may not favor such initiatives. We address this managerial dilemma with a unique Indian CSR regulatory environment. Our results show that firms with greater reputational concerns have a higher proclivity to meet the mandatory CSR investment level but are reluctant to exceed the mandatory CSR limit due to absence of incremental financial benefits.