In the field of distributed consensus and blockchains, the synchronous communication model assumes that all messages between honest parties are delayed at most by a known constant ∆. Recent literature establishes that the longest-chain blockchain protocol is secure under the synchronous model. However, for a fixed mining rate, the security guarantees degrade with ∆. We analyze the performance of the longest-chain protocol under the assumption that the communication delays are random, independent, and identically distributed. This communication model allows for distributions with unbounded support and is a strict generalization of the synchronous model. We provide safety and liveness guarantees with simple, explicit bounds on the failure probabilities. These bounds hold for infinite-horizon executions and decay exponentially with the security parameter. In particular, we show that the longest-chain protocol has good security guarantees when delays are sporadically large and possibly unbounded, which is reflective of real-world network conditions.

Longest-chain protocols such as the one invented by Nakamoto for Bitcoin achieve liveness when the number of participating users is unknown, i.e., they are adaptive. However, they are not safe under network partitions, i.e., they do not achieve finality. On the other hand, there are many byzantine fault tolerant protocols that achieve finality, but not adaptivity. Indeed, the CAP theorem in the context of blockchains asserts that no protocol can simultaneously offer both adaptivity and finality. We propose a new and simple blockchain protocol, the checkpointed longest chain, that offers a single protocol along with two distinct confirmation rules: one that guarantees finality, and another that is adaptive, thus letting clients make a local choice between adaptivity and finality. Our solution builds on and sheds insight on the design of finality gadgets, which have become popular methods for achieving deterministic finality in proof-of-work protocols. Furthermore, like most deployed blockchains, our proposed solution allows for coupled validity, i.e., the finalized blocks lie on a single chain, and therefore, nodes can attest to the validity of transactions while proposing blocks.

A message passing algorithm is derived for recovering communities within a graph generated by a variation of the Barabási-Albert preferential attachment model. The estimator is assumed to know the arrival times, or order of attachment, of the vertices. The derivation of the algorithm is based on belief propagation under an independence assumption. Two precursors to the message passing algorithm are analyzed: the first is a degree thresholding (DT) algorithm and the second is an algorithm based on the arrival times of the children (C) of a given vertex, where the children of a given vertex are the vertices that attached to it. Comparison of the performance of the algorithms shows it is beneficial to know the arrival times, not just the number, of the children. The probability of correct classification of a vertex is asymptotically determined by the fraction of vertices arriving before it. Two extensions of Algorithm C are given: the first is based on joint likelihood of the children of a fixed set of vertices; it can sometimes be used to seed the message passing algorithm. The second is the message passing algorithm. Simulation results are given. 1

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Security analyses for consensus protocols in blockchain research have primarily focused on the synchronous model, where point-to-point communication delays are upper bounded by a known finite constant. These models are unrealistic in noisy settings, where messages may be lost (i.e. incur infinite delay). In this work, we study the impact of message losses on the security of the proof-of-work longest-chain protocol. We introduce a new communication model to capture the impact of message loss called the 0-∞ model, and derive a region of tolerable adversarial power under which the consensus protocol is secure. The guarantees are derived as a simple bound for the probability that a transaction violates desired security properties. Specifically, we show that this violation probability decays almost exponentially in the security parameter. Our approach involves constructing combinatorial objects from blocktrees, and identifying random variables associated with them that are amenable to analysis. This approach improves existing bounds and extends the known regime for tolerable adversarial threshold in settings where messages may be lost.