The authors propose an interpersonal social-cognitive theory of the self and personality, the relational self, in which knowledge about the self is linked with knowledge about significant others, and each linkage embodies a self-other relationship. Mental representations of significant others are activated and used in interpersonal encounters in the social-cognitive phenomenon of transference (S. M. Andersen & N. S. Glassman, 1996), and this evokes the relational self. Variability in relational selves depends on interpersonal contextual cues, whereas stability derives from the chronic accessibility of significant-other representations. Relational selves function in if-then terms (W. Mischel & Y. Shoda, 1995), in which ifs are situations triggering transference, and thens are relational selves. An individual's repertoire of relational selves is a source of interpersonal patterns involving affect, motivation, self-evaluation, and self-regulation.

This research used an idiographic method to examine the proposition that significant others are mentally represented as well-organized person categories that can influence social perception even more than representations of nonsignificant others, stereotypes, or traits. Together, Studies 1 and 2 showed that significant-other representations are richer, more distinctive, and more cognitively accessible than the other categories. Study 3 replicated the accessibility data and gauged inferential power by indirectly activating each category in a learning trial about a fictional person and then testing recognition memory. The results showed that participants made more category-consistent false-positive errors about targets who activated significant others vs. any other category. This constitutes the first experimental demonstration of transference and has implications both for social categorization and for basic personality processes.

Based on an information-processing model of transference and a recent experimental demonstration of transference, defined in terms of "biased inference and memory" (Andersen & Cole, 1990), the present research examined the transfer of affective responses to a new individual, as in schema-triggered affect (Fiske, 1982). Using idiographic stimulus-generation procedures and a nomothetic experimental design, we exposed subjects to a description of a new, unknown person, allegedly seated next door. The description resembled either a positively or negatively toned significant other from the subject's own life or from another subject's life. As predicted, and replicating previous work, subjects misremembered the target person as having more representation-consistent features when the target resembled their own significant other rather than someone else's. Moreover, and also as predicted, subjects transferred more representation-consistent affect to this same target person. The data are discussed in terms of conceptions of transference and basic aspects of social cognition.

Research has shown that the activation and application of a significant-other representation to a new person, or transference, occurs in everyday social perception (S. M. Andersen & A. Baum, 1994; S. M. Andersen & S. W. Cole, 1990). Using a combined idiographic and nomothetic experimental paradigm, two studies examined the role of chronic accessibility of significant-other representations in transference. After learning about 4 fictional people, 1 of whom resembled a significant other, participants' recognition memory was assessed. Both studies showed greater false-positive memory in the significant-other condition, relative to control, even in the absence of priming. Study 2 showed that although the effect was greater when the significant-other representation was concretely applicable to the target information, it occurred even when no such applicability was present. Results implicate the chronic accessibility of significant-other representations in transference. Mental representations of significant others serve as storehouses of information about important individuals from one's life. Interestingly, these representations can also be triggered by a new person and applied to this person in the context of everyday interpersonal relations (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen & Cole, 1990). When a new person activates a representation of a significant other, the person may come to be remembered as having qualities that he or she does not possess because these qualities describe the significant other. We propose that transference is best defined in terms of this exact process-in which a perceiver "goes beyond the information given" about a new person by inferentially filling in the blanks about him or her (Bruner, 1957; see also Andersen & Glassman, in press). In the process, the truth of what was learned at encoding becomes confused with what was simply inferred on the basis of the significant-other representation (see also Johnson, Hastroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981), such that false-positive memory is more likely to emerge. Moreover, by means of the basic mechanism of schema-triggered affect (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986), the newly encountered person may also come to be evaluated in a manner consistent with the representation (Andersen & Baum, 1994).

Recent research has demonstrated transference in social perception, defined in terms of memory and schema-triggered evaluation in relation to a new person (S. M. Andersen & A. B. Baum, 1994; S. M. Andersen & S. W. Cole, 1990; S. M. Andersen, N. S. Glassman, S. Chen, & S. W. Cole, 1995). The authors examined schema-triggered facial affect in transference, along with motivations and expectancies. In a nomothetic experimental design, participants encountered stimulus descriptors of a new target person that were derived either from their own idiographic descriptions of a positively toned or a negatively toned significant other or from a yoked control participant's descriptors. Equal numbers of positive and negative target descriptors were presented, regardless of the overall tone of the representation. The results verified the memory effect and schema-triggered evaluation in transference, on the basis of significant-other resemblance in the target person. Of importance, participants' nonverbal expression of facial affect when learning about the target person (i.e., at encoding) reflected the overall tone of their significant-other representation under the condition of significant-other resemblance, providing strong support for schema-triggered affect in transference, through the use of this unobtrusive, nonverbal measure. Parallel effects on interpersonal closeness motivation and expectancies for acceptance/rejection in transference also emerged.