The concept of the 'relief-to-development continuum' has been the subject of renewed interest in recent years. Concerned by the rise in relief budgets over the past decade and the absolute fall in development aid resources, support has been growing for the concept of developmental relief. In the context of complex political emergencies, it has been argued further that as effective development aid can reduce vulnerability to the impact of natural hazards, so it might also be used to contribute to a process of conflict prevention. In this way, the concept of the relief-development continuum has become entwined with broader discussions about the contribution of official development assistance management. Drawing on a Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), this paper cautions against uncritical application of the concept of the continuum in complex political emergencies and rehabilitation in particular, in the current Sudanese context. It argues that in order to move legitimately from relief aid programming to development aid programming, three fundamental conditions must be in place: first, a minimum level of security, respect for human rights and humanitarian access. Second, empirical evidence from the field needs to demonstrate that the emergency is over. Finally, moving from relief to development aid programming is contingent on donor governments accepting the legitimacy of national governmental structures and of the rebel movements. In other words, for donor governments, moving along the continuum is in significant part determined by foreign policy considerations, not only technical ones. Consideration needs to be given to the actual and perceived legitimation of the different movements that a move to rehabilitation might be seen to imply. The paper argues that none of these conditions had been satisfied in Sudan by mid-1997. Instead of a process of normalisation paving the way to long-term development, the current situation in Sudan is better described as a chronic political emergency. In such a context, uncritical pursuit of developmental strategies may negatively affect the welfare of conflict-affected populations.

This article examines whether it is possible to target vulnerable households within a geographically defined area. It looks first at the justification for targeting and then reviews recent practical experience in actually trying to reach vulnerable groups. As complex emergencies increasingly last longer, strategies to target vulnerable households are common in the protracted phase of the emergency. While this is often necessary because of a decline in resources, it is not always justified by an improvement in nutritional status or food security of the beneficiary population. Common target groups are the poor and the malnourished, but in complex emergencies these are not always the most vulnerable. Moreover, recent practical experience has shown considerable difficulties in targeting the poor. Methods to target the poor rely on community-based relief committees, whose priorities are not necessarily the same as those of external agencies. This paper gives examples of such targeted assistance programmes in Kenya, south Sudan and Tanzania. The paper concludes that situations where targeting vulnerable households is justified and feasible are extremely limited. It is suggested that if targeting has to be done because of scarce resources, this should be done on a geographical basis and on the basis of nutritional status. Case-study material shows that it is essential to understand the political determinants of vulnerability and to design methods that will reach the most vulnerable.

This paper presents the findings from research on livelihoods-protection linkages from the perspective of conflict-affected populations as well as agency analysis and action. The aim of the research is to understand how greater complementarity between humanitarian protection and livelihoods approaches might reduce the risks facing conflict-affected populations. The findings show that the causes of risks to livelihoods and protection are often the same, and that community responses are intimately connected, providing good rationale for linking operational approaches. There are four main ways in which this can be done. First, by targeting those confronting the greatest risks. Second, by addressing the causes of risks through advocacy and capacity-building. Third, by implementing livelihoods interventions that minimise the need to adopt unsafe livelihood strategies and that address humanitarian consequences. Fourth, by making sure that livelihoods programming does not pose additional risks.

“In 2004, the UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan called Darfur the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. A comprehensive food aid programme soon followed, at the time the largest in the world. Yet by 2014, while the crisis continued, international agencies found they had limited access to much of the population, with the Sudanese regime effectively controlling who received aid. As a result, acute malnutrition remains persistently high. Food Aid in Sudan argues that the situation in Sudan is emblematic of a far wider problem. Analysing the history of food aid in the country over fifty years, Jaspars shows that such aid often serves to enrich local regimes and the private sector while leaving war-torn populations in a state of permanent emergency. Drawing on her decades of experience as an aid worker and researcher in the region, and extensive interviews with workers in the food aid process, Jaspars brings together two key topics of our time: the failure of the humanitarian system to respond to today’s crises, and the crisis in the global food system. Essential reading for students and researchers across the social sciences studying the nature and effectiveness of contemporary humanitarianism, development and international aid.”

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