We examine outcome satisfaction in situations in which people receive better outcomes than comparable other persons. Building on classical and modern social psychological theories, we argue that when reacting to these arrangements of advantageous inequity, judging the advantage is quick and easy as preferences are primary. We further propose that adjusting this appraisal requires cognitive resources as it entails integrating fairness concerns with the initial preference appraisal. Extending the literature on cognitive busyness, we therefore predict that people should be more satisWed with advantageous inequity when cognitive processing is strongly-as opposed to weakly-limited. Findings across several diVerent experimental paradigms support our predictions. Taken together, our Wndings shed light on the psychological processes underlying the intriguing interplay between egoism-and fairnessbased considerations when evaluating outcomes, as well as on more general preference and adjustment processes. © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Keywords: Fairness; Justice; Equity; Preferences; Cognitive busyness Numerous scientiWc disciplines, including philosophy, sociology, political sciences, economics, and psychology, had good reasons to focus on the issue of how people form evaluations of the outcomes they have received. A vital view in both classic and modern social psychology emphasizes the importance of drawing a distinction between two diVerent reference points in the outcome evaluation process (e.g

This article focuses on when justice is especially important to people and, in doing so, explores the social conditions under which the importance of justice may change in social interactions. More specifically, the authors examine how different types of relationships affect evaluations of equitable and inequitable situations. It is argued that when people are confronted with friends as interaction partners, as opposed to unknown others, they are motivated to attend to the needs of their friends (Clark & Mills, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 12-24, 1979) and, therefore, they are not only concerned with their own outcomes, but also with their friends' outcomes. As predicted on the basis of this line of reasoning, two experiments demonstrate that when people's interaction partners are friends, people are indeed more satisfied with being underpaid and less satisfied with being overpaid compared to when their interaction partners are unknown others. In the discussion, it is argued that these findings suggest that justice is especially important to people when they are in communal relationships.

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Based on the idea that overpaid people are in conflict between hedonic principles (i.e., what makes them pleased) and what they believe to be right, two studies tested the hypothesis that it should be relatively difficult for people to make satisfaction judgments regarding outcomes in which they are being advantaged. In line with this hypothesis, Study 1 demonstrated that response latencies of satisfaction judgments were longer when participants were being overpaid, compared to when they were underpaid or equally paid. Study 2 extended these findings by demonstrating that people required more time to make satisfaction judgments when they were overpaid in the context of a close relationship (i.e., in which the conflict between hedonic and concerns for the other's need should be stronger) than when overpaid in the context of a non-close relationship. Theoretical implications regarding the social-cognitive processes underlying reactions to overpayment are discussed.

What's left of justice issues in today's busy society? What's left of justice issues in today's busy society? S.L. Peters & K. van den Bos, Gedrag & Organisatie, volume 20, November 2007, nr. 4, pp. 382-391 In today's busy society, people have less and less time. In the current paper we argue that busy people are more influenced by egocentric issues than by issues that are justice related. Several social psychological experiments support this suggestion. Furthermore, we discuss in this paper the mechanism that may explain people's reactions to being overpaid. We suggest a two-phase model of reactions to the conflict between justice and egoism. Specifically, we propose that when people are better paid than comparable other persons, judging the advantage of receiving an advantageous outcome is quick and easy as preferences are primary. We further propose that adjusting this appraisal requires cognitive resources as it entails integrating fairness concerns with the initial preference appraisal.