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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. JEL classification: E32, E52 Terms of use: Documents in

This paper integrates a money and credit market into a static approximation of the baseline New Keynesian model based on a money-and-credit-in-the-utility approach, in which real balances and borrowing contribute to the household’s utility. In this framework, the central bank has no direct control over the interest rate on bonds. Instead, the central bank’s instrument variables are the monetary base and the refinancing rate, i. e. the rate at which the central bank provides loans to the banking sector. Our approach gives rise to a credit channel, in which current and expected future interest rates on the bond and loan market directly affect current goods demand. The credit channel amplifies the output effects of isolated monetary disturbances. Taking changes in private (inflation and interest rate) expectations into account, we find that - contrarily to BERNANKE and BLINDER (1988) - the credit channel may also dampen the output effects of monetary disturbances. The expansionary effects of a monetary expansion may be substantially diminished if the monetary disturbance is accompanied by a contractionary credit shock. In a dynamic version of our model, in which expectations are formed endogenously, we find that the credit channel amplifies output responses.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractA recent theoretical literature highlights the role of endogenous firm entry as an internal amplification mechanism of business cycle fluctuations. The amplification mechanism works through the competition and the variety effect. This paper tests the significance of this amplification mechanism, quantifies its importance, and disentangles the competition and the variety effect.To this end, we estimate a medium-scale real business cycle model with firm entry for the U.S.economy. The competition and the variety effect are estimated to be statistically significant. Together, they amplify the volatility of output by 8.5 percent relative to a model in which both effects are switched off. The competition effect accounts for most amplification, whereas the variety effect only plays a minor role.JEL classification: E20, E32

This paper uses a dynamic framework of a small open economy to study the volatility effects of partially anticipated monetary policy shocks in which the public has imperfect information about the size and/or the timing of the future expansionary policy intervention. Our two main results are as follows: (i) Partially anticipated monetary policy shocks may be stabilizing, i. e. lead to a lower volatility than a fully anticipated monetary policy shock of the same form.(ii) However, we typically obtain a trade off in volatilities such that a simultaneous stabilization of inflation and output is not possible. If the public underestimates (overestimates) the size of the shock, output (inflation) may be stabilized. Our results imply that the central bank may have an incentive to withhold information from the public about the true central bank's intention.