Despite the importance of Suárez’s defense of the freedom of the will at the threshold of early modern philosophy, his account has received scant recent attention. This paper aims partially to redress that neglect. Suárez’s position can be understood as a balancing act between desiring to attribute libertarian freedom to agents and desiring to maintain the will’s status as a rational appetite. Hence, he rejects an intellectualism that says that choices are necessitated by the intellect’s judgements (since he does not think that the judgements themselves can be directly free), but affirms that only what is judged good can be chosen.

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«There has been a great deal of super-subtle dividing of intentions into actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative; but if you are going to take your stand on logic you must be ready to face a logical conclusion.» -Mr. ogilvie in sir Compton MacKenzie's novel The Altar Steps 1AbSTrAcT: Suárez distinguishes between four different ways of intending an end of action: actually, virtually, habitually, and interpretatively. This distinction comes to be repeated in scores of books and articles in subsequent centuries as a standard part of action theory, and Suárez is evidently the source for many of the later authors. This paper examines Suárez's treatment of the distinction. Interpretative intention receives the most attention, since Suárez appears to give several inconsistent characterizations of it in different works. The paper ends with some notes about the subsequent reception of the distinction and reflects briefly on the lessons to be drawn about tracing Suárez's influence.KEy WOrdS: Suárez; intention; actual intention; virtual intention; habitual intention; interpretative intention. Cuatro tipos de intención: actual, habitual, virtual e interpretativarESuMEN: Suárez distingue entre cuatro formas diferentes de intentar un fin de acción: con una intención actual, virtual, habitual o interpretativa. Esta distinción se repite en muchos libros y artículos en siglos posteriores como una parte estándar de la teoría de la acción, y Suárez es evidentemente la fuente de muchos de los autores posteriores. Este artículo examina el tratamiento de Suárez de la distinción. La intención interpretativa recibe la mayor atención, ya que Suárez parece dar varias caracterizaciones inconsistentes de ella en diferentes obras. El artículo concluye con algunas notas sobre la posterior recepción de la distinción y comenta brevemente las lecciones que se deben aprender sobre cómo rastrear la influencia de Suárez.PALAbrAS cLAvE: Suárez; intención; intención actual; intención virtual; intención habitual; intención interpretativa.