We explore how managerial stock holdings and option holdings affect CEOs' income smoothing incentives. Given the different roles of stock holdings and option holdings in solving agency problems, managers may smooth past earnings using discretionary accruals for the purpose of revealing information to help investors better predict future earnings or for the purpose of hiding volatility of past earnings. We find the association between past smoothing and predictability of future earnings is increasing (decreasing) in CEO stock (option) holdings. Results are consistent with stock holdings aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, and managers using discretionary accruals to smooth past earnings to reveal information to investors about future performance. In contrast, option holdings have been linked with excessive risk taking by managers, and managers use discretionary accruals to mask volatility of less predictable earnings. We demonstrate that income smoothing can be informative or opportunistic, depending on the incentives of CEOs.

We investigate whether variation in the volatility of tax outcomes across firms is associated with the extent of financial constraints. We document a positive association between current-period financial constraints and the volatility of cash effective tax rates in subsequent periods. We find that this positive association becomes more pronounced as firms avoid more cash taxes. These results suggest that as financial constraints increase, the benefits of cash tax savings more likely outweigh the costs associated with more volatile tax outcomes. Recent research documents a negative association between financial constraints and the level of cash taxes paid. Our evidence suggests that tax strategies adopted by more financially constrained firms to increase cash tax savings come at the price of more volatile future tax rates.

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