The central question in Chen's work is: What were the inter-relationship between China (Nationalist or Communist) and Vietnam (both north and south) in the pre-Geneva period? In an attempt to answer this question, he has made a penetrating study of the historical, ideological, and military complex of the countries using government documents, monitoring radio broadcasts, interviewing and corresponding with the political activists who held the military or government offices in the 1930's and 1940's.While his treatment of the data is largely descriptive, qualitative, and chronological, Chen's analytical and evaluative approach in dealing with the historical events succeeds in avoiding a mere empiricism or historicism. In this respect, his work is not only valuable to historians but also to political scientists. Although nowhere in the book is the rationale for the selection of the period 1938-54 specifically clarified, it has become clear that a comprehensive knowledge of the political events in that period, the major purpose of the book, contributes significantly to the understanding of why and how the United States became involved in the Vietnam war today.Of more significance, Chen's research makes it clear that neither Chinese (or French) Communists, nor the Soviet Union had promoted the revolutionary birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945; this is tantamount to the rejection of the commonly accepted hypothesis of an international Communist conspiracy for a worldwide revolution. Time and again, Chen points out, both directly and indirectly, that Ho Chi Minh was above all a strong national (instead of an international) Communist and that Ho was not only a successful opportunist, but also a tactical strategist -once pro-Nationalist China during the Chinese Nationalist Army occupation of Hanoi and then pro-Peking following Mao's ascendancy to power in 1949. He also made use of a powerful Nationalist Chinese general in his struggle for national independence.Most revealing, particularly in chapters 4 and 5, is the fact that the Viet-Minh theory of war, while undoubtedly modeled on Mao's military thoughts (such as rural-attack-urban, four-class alliance, and people's war) has not been the direct replica of the latter; instead, it was a cautious adaptation to Vietnmese circumstances. Chen also succeeds in demonstrating that the Vietnam-China relationship could be better examined in terms of the varying aspects of historical tradition, cultural background, racial affinity, geographical proximity, and military vantage rather than a single factor of ideological similarity between the two countries.In view of this, one will not have difficulty in understanding the dominant role played by Communist China in reaching settlements at the Geneva Conference. For this very reason, to those who are still convinced that the so-called
