Although the importance of buyer-supplier relationship has long been focused in literature of business and management, little is known about complaint management and its impacts in the context of business-to-business. This study tries to address this gap in the literature by investigating the impacts of complaint management and perceived fairness on the relationship of suppliers' long-term orientation towards the buyer firm.Based on the profound review of the literature, a conceptual model will be developed and hypotheses will be suggested. We use fairness theory as the theoretical grounding for this research and develop a conceptual model that suggests examining the effects of fairness (i.e. procedural, distributive, interaction, and information justice) on trust, commitment and conflict. We further suggest examining the impact of these relational characteristics on the long-term orientation, cooperation, and opportunism as well as examining the moderating role of relationship quality on the link between perceived fairness and relational characteristics.

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In the literature, although a few studies can be found regarding the application of revenue management to special cases of Make-to-Order manufacturing systems with stochastic capacity, there is not any study when capacity or demand (or both) are random variables with general distribution function. Therefore, in this paper, an approach is developed to study a more general case of Make-to-Order manufacturing systems based on the concept of revenue management. Due to the random nature of capacity and demand, the exact size of capacity to satisfy the orders is not known at the time of arriving orders. Consequently, the vital decision is either to accept or reject an order at the time of arrival. If an order is accepted but later rejected due to the lack of capacity, a penalty has to be paid to the customer. On the other hand, an order can be rejected by anticipating the capacity shortage at the time its arrival, while there will be some unused capacity at the processing stage. Then, this also results in the loss of revenue. We assume there are two classes of customers. The price paid by the customers of each class or the penalty paid to them is different from those of the other class customers. Although the objective function which represents the expected total revenue is not necessarily concave, this study demonstrates that it has unimodal property and as a result the existence of an optimal solution is guaranteed. This property has been proved previously for special cases where demand or capacity is continuous random variable. This study confirms this property also holds in more general cases. The proposed approach for a variety of scenarios, discrete and mixed random variables, is investigated by simulation techniques.

This paper aims to develop and simulate a green automotive supply chain model (ASC) consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and two types of products (green and non-green) under disruption risks (DRs). The greening effort (i.e., electric vehicle production) is considered for both the supplier and the manufacturer. In our modeling, we include the local government intervention (GI) and their incentivization of manufacturers to produce greener products. Moreover, the effectiveness of centralized versus decentralized supply chain integration strategies in coping with disruption consequences was explored. A mathematical pricing model based on game theory is designed to maximize the total profit for both integrated and decentralized systems. The model examines the effects of the greening effort on the supply chain (SC) members with eight disruption scenarios, including Extra Production and Surplus Inventory. Simulating numerical examples reveals that the Extra Production type of disruption increase the profitability in different scenarios. Conversely, the Surplus Inventory disruption reduces profitability. Moreover, a channel coordination through cost sharing contract in the presence of disruption sharing was developed. GI and the cost-sharing contract increase the SC profit. The managerial implications of our findings are also discussed in this paper.