Asia is narrated in Japanese foreign policy pronouncements as an opportunity as well as a threat. Despite the purported transformation from militarism to pacifism since August 1945, the reified images of Asia as an 'entity out there' remain resilient. The image of a dangerous Asia prompted Japan to engage in its programme of colonialism before the War; and compels policy makers to address territorial disputes with Asian neighbours today. Simultaneously, Asia persistently symbolises an opportunity for Tokyo to exploit. Hence, despite the psychological rupture of August 1945, reified Asia remains a reality in Japanese foreign policy.

How are Japanese identity narratives constructed in the Tokyo 2016 campaign and the Tokyo 2020 bid and organisation? The earlier narratives of Tokyo 1940 and 1964 bids entailed invoking the Western Otherness to emphasise Japan's Asian affinity while simultaneously emphasising Japan's un-Asian characteristics, effectively employing dual Otherness to tell the story of Japanese Self. Tokyo's position as a global city today means that Japanese Self is now constituted through multiple Otherness involving the West, Asia, as well as the primacy of Tokyo in opposition to the relative neglect of the periphery, constructing a more complex story of Otherness. There are concerns Tokyo is hoarding infrastructure investment ahead of Tokyo 2020, just as the regions affected by March 2011 disasters require capital infusion, fuelling a sense of Tokyo versus the rest. Hence, on top of the residual dual Otherness that can still be witnessed, Tokyo 2020 grafts another layer of Otherness, this time at the domestic level. In this article, I explore identity narratives by policy elites and opinion leaders to show the complex nature of multi-layered Otherness in the Tokyo 2016 and 2020 bidding and organisation.

Why are Japanese policymakers intent on visiting Yasukuni Shrine, and why do they continue to hold China and South Korea solely responsible for the “politics of memory” in diplomatic relations? It is easy—and perhaps misleading—to suggest that Japan does not care about China or South Korea, and also to argue that Japan's memory of World War II is one of “glory” rather than “aggression.” Instead, I posit the idea that Japan's memory of the war is, indeed, traumatic, and that the postwar legacy of a “democratic and peaceful” nation makes it difficult for the policymakers to countenance Chinese/South Korean criticisms.

'Cool Japan' is an instance of Japanese government's nation branding exercise as part of its soft power projection in which the unique selling point is identified as Japanese national identity. In this paper, I examine the relationship between Cool Japan and Japanese national identity and highlight a tension in the construction. Cool Japan is about emphasizing Japan's attractiveness for public diplomacy, while the top-down nature of the branding undermines the imagery that the branding is designed to convey. I show that policy elites resolve this tension by invoking the traditional Japanese identity narratives that construct Japan into both a non-Western and an un-Asian entity, reproducing the myth of Japanese uniqueness. I argue that the elite narratives surrounding Cool Japan readily replicate the language reminiscent of prewar identity construction. Despite the contemporary popularity of manga and anime, the purported 'coolness' of these products are framed within older constructions of Japanese Self that can trace their pedigree back to the 19th century. Using the minutes of committee meetings, policy documents, as well as media interviews given by policy-and business elites, I show that Cool Japan is effectively a 21 st century rendition of the familiar Japanese identity construction.

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