Consumers evaluate the convenience of changing their products according to the price paid as well as the technology (quality) level. When the consumers wish to capitalize the products residual value, they should return them as early as possible. Accordingly, we develop a model of Closed-loop Supply Chain (CLSC) where consumers seek to gain as much as possible from their returns and the return rate is a function of both price and quality. We model a two-period Stackelberg game to capture the dynamic aspects of a CLSC, where the manufacturer is the channel leader. We investigate who, namely, manufacturer or retailer, should collect the products in the market. Thus, we identify the best CLSC structure to adopt when the return rate is both price-and quality-dependent. Our results demonstrate that it is always worthwhile for companies to collect products and adopt an active return approach for returns. We investigate the eect of retail competition in both forward and backward channels and show the impact of eliminating the double marginalization on market outcomes.

The performance of many of the technologies used in physical protection systems that guard high-value assets are heavily influenced by weather and visibility conditions as well as intruder capabilities. This complicates the already difficult problem of optimizing the design of multi-layered physical protection systems. This paper develops an optimization model for the automatic design of these systems with explicit consideration of the impact of weather and visibility conditions as well as intruder capabilities on system performance. An illustrative case study is provided.

Within a Closed-loop Supply Chain (CLSC) framework we study several consumer return behaviors for the used products which are based on the product prices and rebates. Consumers evaluate the rebate they receive as well as the price of the new product before deciding whether to dump a return. Therefore, the number of used products returned is examined under two types of rebates: a …xed rebate and a variable rebate. We search for the optimal rebate mechanism and …nd that the CLSC pro…ts are higher under an variable rebate policy. This …nding justi…es the industry practices that employ a rebate mechanism based on both the value and the price of used item. We o¤er two types of solution concepts to the CLSC games: open-loop Stackelberg solution and Markov perfect Stackelberg solution, which are commonly employed in the dynamic games literature. While we mainly employ Markovian equilibrium, we also allow …rms to utilize open-loop strategies so as to assess the impact of precommitment on the market outcomes. Therefore, we o¤er a comprehensive analysis of all possible market equilibrium solutions under di¤erent strategic considerations and the commitment deliberations. We show that under the …xed rebate regime open-loop solution coincides with Markov perfect solution. Furthermore, we show how consumer return behavior impacts the dynamic nature of the game. We …nd that the time frame is irrelevant if …rms o¤er a …xed rebate. In contrast, the game will be fully dynamic when …rms o¤er a variable rebate.