Grade inflation and high grade levels have been subjects of concern and public debate in recent decades. In the mid-1990s, Cornell University's Faculty Senate had a number of discussions about grade inflation and what might be done about it. In April 1996, the Faculty Senate voted to adopt a new grade reporting policy which had two parts: 1) the publication of course median grades on the Internet; and 2) the reporting of course median grades in students' transcripts. The policy change followed the determination of a university committee that "it is desirable for Cornell University to provide more information to the reader of a transcript and produce more meaningful letter grades." It was hoped that "More accurate recognition of performance may encourage students to take courses in which the median grade is relatively low." The median grade policy has remained to date only partially implemented: median grades have been reported online since 1998 but do not yet appear in transcripts. We evaluate the effect of the implemented policy on patterns of course choice and grade inflation. Specifically, we test two related hypotheses: First, all else being equal, the availability of online grade information will lead to increased enrollment into leniently graded courses. Second, high-ability students will be less attracted to the leniently graded courses than their peers. Building on these results we perform an exercise that identifies the extent to which the change in student behavior resulted in an increase in the university-wide mean grade.

This paper considers a multistage dynamic R&D race in which the competitors strategically publish research findings. Publications change the prior art, thus affecting patentability. Firms publish when they are behind in the race and their rival is close to winning it. Publication sets back both competitors and gives the follower a chance to catch up. Publications prolong the race. Firms are more likely to publish the more patient they are, and the higher their probability of success. Asymmetry between the firms generates additional incentives to publish such as protecting profits from a previous patent and increasing a strong firm's probability of winning. When firms face a joint decision on publications and the intensity of research, publications substitute investment.

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We examine factors behind firms' decisions to contribute to open standard setting. Our study highlights a novel explanation: firms seek to improve their positions in an interfirm cooperation network. In the wireless telecommunications standard‐setting organization we study, firms develop new technical specifications in small committees. Our panel data analyses demonstrate that interorganizational network connections influence firms' decisions to support committees. Additionally, firms are more likely to support committees when they are technologically distant from the firm that initiated the committee. We argue that standard setting presents opportunities for information exchange and for accessing complementary R&D assets through the cooperation network.