We present evidence from laboratory experiments showing that individuals are “last-place averse.” Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. In modified dictator games, participants randomly placed in second-to-last place are the most likely to give money to the person one rank above them instead of the person one rank below. Last-place aversion suggests that low-income individuals might oppose redistribution because it could differentially help the group just beneath them. Using survey data, we show that individuals making just above the minimum wage are the most likely to oppose its increase. Similarly, in the General Social Survey, those above poverty but below median income support redistribution significantly less than their background characteristics would predict.

The 'certainty effect' is a notable violation of expected utility theory by decision makers. It shows that people's tendency to select the safer of two prospects increases when this prospect provides a good outcome with certainty (for example, people prefer a monetary gain of 3 with certainty over 4 with a probability of 0.8, but do not prefer 3 with a probability of 0.25 over 4 with a probability of 0.2). Subsequent work on experience-based decision making in rats extended the certainty effect to other animals, suggesting its generality across different species and different decision-making mechanisms. However, an attempt to replicate this study with human subjects showed a surprising 'reversed certainty effect', namely, the tendency to prefer the safer option decreases when this prospect is associated with certainty (and people now prefer 4 with a probability of 0.8 over 3 with certainty). Here we show that these conflicting results can be explained by perceptual noise and that the certainty effect can be restored experimentally by reducing perceptual accuracy. Using complementary experiments in humans and honeybees (Apis mellifera), we show that by manipulating perceptual accuracy in experience-based tasks, both the certainty and the reversed certainty effects can be exhibited by humans and other animals: the certainty effect emerges when it is difficult to discriminate between the different rewards, whereas the reversed certainty effect emerges when discrimination is easy. Our results fit a simple process-based model of matching behaviour, capable of explaining the certainty effect in humans and other animals that make repeated decisions based on experience. This mechanism should probably be distinguished from those involved in the original certainty effect that was exhibited by human subjects in single description-based problems.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Ryan Buell acknowledges a doctoral student stipend from Harvard Business School. Taly Reich acknowledges a doctoral student stipend from Stanford Business School. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

Why do low-income individuals often oppose redistribution? We hypothesize that an aversion to being in "last place" undercuts support for redistribution, with low-income individuals punishing those slightly below themselves to keep someone "beneath" them. In laboratory experiments, we find support for "last-place aversion" in the contexts of risk aversion and redistributive preferences. Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. Similarly, in money-transfer games, those randomly placed in second-to-last place are the least likely to costlessly give money to the player one rank below. Last-place aversion predicts that those earning just above the minimum wage will be most likely to oppose minimum-wage increases as they would no longer have a lower-wage group beneath them, a prediction we confirm using survey data.

Mistakes are often undesirable and frequently result in negative inferences about the person or company that made the mistake. Consequently, research suggests that information about mistakes is rarely shared with consumers. However, we find that consumers actually prefer products that were made by mistake to otherwise identical products that were made intentionally. This preference arises because consumers perceive that a product made by mistake is more improbable relative to a product made intentionally, and thus, view the product as more unique. We find converging evidence for this preference in a field study, six experiments, and eBay auction sales. Importantly, this preference holds regardless of whether the mistake enhances or detracts from the product. However, in domains where consumers do not value uniqueness (e.g., utilitarian goods), the preference is eliminated.