1 There are, however, other analysts who argue for a trichotomized structure: a large center (60%) and two smaller radical camps at the left (20%) and the right (20%) sides of the political map; e.g. Arian (1999).

Abstract. This article reviews four different advocacies of bi‐nationalism in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Despite the differences in their context, content and style, let alone in motivations and implications, the four advocacies – the ‘old school’ and the ‘new school’ of Jewish bi‐nationalism, contemporary Palestinian bi‐nationalism, and bi‐nationalist advocacy that comes from outside observers – present certain similarities which reduce their chances of becoming a mainstream option: (a) in all cases bi‐nationalism is not the most desirable option; (b) they all gained momentum on both sides in periods of instability – due to transformations in the power relations between them or when the conflict reaches a point where the violence seems to become unbearable; (c) all these bi‐nationalisms present a rather uneasy mixture of moralistic arguments and pragmatic ones; (d) in all cases the people who embrace the bi‐national model are intellectuals. This gives their recommendations a touch of ‘ivory tower’ overrationalisation, further reducing thier public appeal.

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