In this paper we explore the factors that determine delegation of implementation in project aid. In particular, focusing on the importance of informational asymmetry between levels of government, we empirically assess whether this choice is influenced by the relative importance of the local information at the recipient country level. Moreover, we test whether this choice can in turn influence project performance. Using information on more than 5800 World Bank projects for the period 1995-2014, and controlling for characteristics at both country and project level, we find that transparency does influence the probability that a project is implemented locally rather than nationally. More specifically, a one standard deviation decline in transparency increases the probability of a locally implemented project by three percentage points. We also find that a local implementing agency may increase the probability of a successful project only up to a certain level of a country’s transparency.

This paper studies the relationship between sovereign debt (final) restructuring and sovereign ratings, by distinguishing between commercial and official debt and by considering the creditors' loss (haircut). Institutional Investor's index is taken as a measure of a country's creditworthiness. We find that while a restructuring with private creditors seems to involve some reputational costs, "official defaulters" are not affected (or may even benefit) by the restructuring episodes. Using the Synthetic Control Method, we find further evidence for the heterogeneity of the economic impact of debt restructurings, confirming that official and private restructurings may have different costs and then induce selective defaults.

This paper studies the relationship between sovereign debt default and annual GDP growth distinguishing between private and o¢ cial deals. Using the Synthetic Control Method to analyze 23 o¢ cial and private defaulters from 1970 to 2017, we find that private and o¢ cial restructurings are associated to di¤erent growth outcomes. Private defaults generate output losses both during the crisis and persisting over time. Conversely, official defaulters do not show a permanent drop in GDP per capita, neither during the crisis nor in its aftermath. We present further evidence for the heterogeneity of the economic impact of debt restructurings by controlling for the severity of the default and distinguishing between debt flow and stock reduction. Using panel data analysis to analyze 548 restructuring episodes, we confirm that o¢ cial and private defaults may have di¤erent e¤ects on GDP growth and should then be treated di¤erently.

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