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PurposeThis paper aims to examine whether the corporate governance rankings published by a market information intermediary are reflected in the values that investors accord to firms.Design/methodology/approachPanel data from 289 Canadian firms in the four‐year period 2002‐2005 were analyzed using a price model.FindingsThe results suggest that the corporate governance rankings published by the market information intermediary are related to not only firm market value, but also to accounting results.Practical implicationsThis study provides empirical observations that would be useful for various organizations involved in the regulation of corporate governance practices and the standardization of relevant data elements.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that information published by an information intermediary is reflected in firm market values. Moreover, this information appears to be related to the accounting results. Thus, good governance rankings are reflected in the accounting results.

Purpose This study aims to examine whether insider purchases made within 30 days prior to the publication of various kinds of press releases earn higher abnormal returns (AR) than those in the absence of such announcements. It also attempts to identify the factors that explain ARs. Design/methodology/approach This study considers data for Canadian insider purchases made on the Toronto Stock Exchange 60 Index. An event study methodology is used to calculate AR, and a mixed regression model is used to evaluate the effect of corporate news on AR. Findings The empirical results indicate that insiders achieve greater ARs when they purchase stock prior to press releases; findings also show that these returns are specifically related to purchases made before the announcements of mergers and acquisitions, ongoing projects, financial structure, financial results and asset disposals. This is because of the firm effect. Practical implications These findings have important implications for Canadian market regulatory authorities, especially the Ontario Securities Commission and other market participants who are interested in corporate governance, such as boards of directors and shareholders. Originality/value The present findings show that regulatory bodies must work with companies to raise awareness of improper insider trading.

Purpose – The purpose of this article is to examine if certain board characteristics have an impact on the total remuneration of top management and the ratio of stock-based remuneration to total top-management remuneration. Design/methodology/approach – The study draws on data from the largest public Canadian companies, the constituents of the TSX/60 index. The study controls for firm size and profitability. Findings – The authors concludes that total remuneration of top management is directly linked to board-member total remuneration and the board average number of director-tenure years. The study also shows that the ratio of stock-based to total top-management remuneration is positively affected by the percentage of independent directors, total remuneration of board directors, the ratio of stock-based remuneration of directors to their total remuneration and the average number of tenure years of the board of directors. Practical implications – If regulators are determined to curb the excesses in top-management remuneration by means of promoting boards with certain characteristics, they should implement measures facilitating the control of directors’ remuneration and tenure, to discourage cronyistic behavior. Good corporate governance requires that the board act as a counterbalance to top management, ensuring that a substantial percentage of top-executive total compensation is variable, and not fixed. According to our findings, the boards that are the most likely to hold managerial avoidance of variable pay in check are those favoring director independence, variable director remuneration and longer director tenures. Social implications – The present article examines specifically the latter aspect, namely, the role of board characteristics (independence, size, compensation, board director ownership and tenure, etc.) in the determination of top-management compensation. This relationship is important because it allows us to further the analysis of corporate governance. If the above-mentioned traits of boards have a meaningful relationship with the compensation of the top management, one might conclude that certain practices in the composition of boards could influence good corporate governance practices. This is relevant for regulatory agencies, for investors and for corporations. Originality/value – The article adds to the extant literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it considers the role of the traits of the board in the determination of the compensation of the top-management teams, and not only of the chief executive officer, as is the focus of previous literature. Secondly, the article focuses on the power interplay between boards and managers, and, more particularly, on the ability of boards to be an effective mechanism of corporate governance. Finally, the article examines the potential impact of board traits in the determination of top-management compensation in the context of Canadian firms, a subject that has received less attention from academic research, which has mostly concentrated on analyzing the issue in the US context.

On order to meet the holistic needs of the client with chronic illness, the nurse is required to adopt many different approaches to care. This article will explore one client-centred counselling approach that can be used by community practitioners to address behavioural change and improve concordance. The techniques are illustrated with an example of where motivational interviewing has been used to great success--in the 'Look After Your Legs' (LAYL) programme undertaken by West Gloucestershire primary care trust. Interventions such as motivational interviewing have the potential to empower clients and so enhance care delivery.