Various open probability-based panel infrastructures have been established in recent years, allowing researchers to collect high-quality survey data. In this report, we describe the processes and deliverables of setting up the GESIS Panel, the first probability-based mixed-mode panel infrastructure in Germany open for data collection to the academic research community. The reference population for the GESIS Panel is the German-speaking population aged between 18 and 70 years permanently residing in Germany. In 2013, approximately 5,000 panelists had been recruited from a random sample drawn from municipal population registers. We describe the outcomes of the sampling strategy and the multistep recruitment process, involving computer-aided personal interviews conducted at respondents’ homes. Next, we describe the outcomes of the two self-administered survey modes (online and paper-and-pencil) of the GESIS Panel used for the initial profile survey and all subsequent bimonthly data collection waves. Across all stages of setting up the GESIS Panel, we report sample composition discrepancies for key demographic variables between the GESIS Panel and established benchmark surveys. Overall, the findings highlight the usefulness of pursuing a mixed-mode strategy when building a probability-based panel infrastructure in Germany.

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Some European law proposals are subject to scrutiny by national parliaments while others go unchecked. The analysis in this article indicates that the opposition scrutinises European Union law to gather information on the proceedings inside the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Yet whereas strong opposition parties scrutinise highly politicised law proposals, weak opposition parties tend to scrutinise those proposals that are negotiated under the non‐transparent fast‐track procedure. In addition, there is ample evidence that the leading minister initiates scrutiny in order to strengthen his or her intergovernmental bargaining leverage. Yet, this Schelling Conjecture presumes that the party of the minister is located between the expected bargaining position in the Council and the coalition partner. Any other domestic interest constellation could lead to scrutiny motivated by whistle blowing. However, an issue's salience helps us to separate the whistle blowing from the Schelling Conjecture.

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Research on European legislative decision-making has entered a stage of quantitative analysis. The quantitative approach promises to advance the current dialogue by allowing for the evaluation of competing approaches across multiple policy domains and over time. At the same time, the quantitative study of EU decision-making introduces a number of drawbacks: it is difficult to identify one definitive source for legislative information, and case-level data are not directly accessible in a machine-readable format. In order to identify the most crucial pitfalls and provide a reliable data source, we evaluate the most frequently cited, publicly available EU legislative database, CELEX, and compare it with a less publicized legislative database referred to as PreLex. We find that CELEX documents legislative events, whereas PreLex records inter-institutional activities in the legislative process. Unsurprisingly, each of these databases has particular advantages, and we discuss which of the two might be better suited for the analysis of specific research questions.